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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is Defendant/Respondent City of McCall's ("City") response brief. It responds to 
Appellant's Brief filed by Plaintiff/Appellant Alpine Village Company ("Alpine"). 1 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an as-applied regulatory takings case involving a development agreement for 
Alpine Village ("Alpine Development Agreement,,)2 and a corresponding development agreement 
for the Timbers ("Timbers Development Agreement,,)3 under which Alpine agreed to make certain 
properties available to qualified purchasers for affordable housing. Ordinances 819 and 820, 
which required affordable housing contributions, were later invalidated. Pursuant to the 
development agreements and Alpine's specific request, R. Vol. III, pp. 422-26, the City released 
Alpine from all housing obligations under those agreements. Years later, Alpine decided that this 
was not enough. Alpine now alleges a "taking" because the market declined and the Timbers is 
now worth less than before. This is an unusual taking case, indeed. Alpine is alleging inverse 
I As reflected in the Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits (R. Vol. III, p. 550), the Affidavit of Martin C. 
Hendrickson (R. Ex. I) and the Affidavit of Steven J. Millemann (R. Ex. II) were lodged with the Court as exhibits 
instead of being included in the Clerk's Record. The Hendrickson affidavit (R. Ex. I), in turn, includes two other 
affidavits: Affidavit of Steven J. Millemann in Support of Motion to Remand (R. Ex. I (Ex. B)) and Affidavit of 
Gregory C. Pittenger in Opposition to Defendant's Motion Dismiss (R. Ex. I (Ex. C)). 
2 The first Alpine Development Agreement was executed by both parties on December 13,2007 and recorded 
as Instrument No. 328801 on January 28,2008. R. Vol. II, p. 225. It was superseded by an identically titled 
document executed by the parties on March 6 and 25, 2008 and recorded as Instrument No. 330524 on April 7,2008. 
R. Ex. I (Ex. B) (Ex. 9). The second agreement is the same as the first, except for Exhibit A (legal description). On 
July 24, 2008 (the effective date), the parties executed the First Amendment to Development Agreement Alpine 
Village Planned Unit Development, which was recorded as Instrument No. 334281 on August 20, 2008. R. Ex. I (Ex. 
C) (Ex. 13). This released Alpine Village from any community housing requirements and deleted Article VII of the 
prior Alpine Development Agreement. A number of further amendments followed, which are not relevant here. 
3 An unexecuted draft of the Timbers Development Agreement is in the record at R. Ex. II (Ex. 13). Alpine 
explains in its Appellant's Brief at 5 that this draft was prepared in conjunction with the approval of the preliminary 
and final plat for the Timbers on March 22,2007. For some reason, it was not executed until 2009. It was signed by 
the City on May 8, 2009 and by Alpine on May 21,2009 and was recorded on July 7,2009 as Instrument # 343026. It 
is in the record as R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 10). This version is identical to the draft except for the addition of a new 
Article VII that is not relevant to this litigation. On the same days, the parties executed and recorded the First 
Amendment to Development Agreement - The Timbers, which removed the housing obligation. Since it was not 
central to this litigation, the 2009 amendment was not made a part of the record before the District Court. However, it 
is a public record, and the City has attached a true and correct copy of the document hereto as Addendum B. 
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condemnation of property it owns in fee, free and clear from any governmental restriction. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The City does not see a need to supplement Alpine's description ofthe course of 
proceedings is set forth in the Statement of the Case on pages 1 and 2 of Appellant's Brief 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
For the convenience ofthe Court, the key events and documents, and their location in the 
record, are set out in a timeline attached to this brief as Addendum A. 
In its initial development applications, Alpine proposed use of mobile home sites it owned 
for affordable housing pursuant to Ordinance 819. R. Ex. II (Ex. 4). When the City said that did 
not comply, Alpine developed a new proposal in which it agreed to provide 17 condominium units 
located in a converted apartment complex known as the Timbers, six on-site units, and an in lieu 
fee for another half unit. R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 4); Appellant's Briefat 5. 
On September 22, 2006, a trade group filed the Mountain Central lawsuit challenging 
Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820. This occurred while Alpine's land use applications were pending 
and before Alpine committed to purchase the Timbers. Two days later, the City imposed a 
moratorium on all new applications. R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 6).4 But it agreed to process pending 
applications subject to agreements providing mutual assurances regarding Mountain Central. 
Accordingly, the City entered into development agreements with Alpine designed to hold the City 
harmless for events during the pendency of Mountain Central. The agreements also provided 
assurance to the developer that any affordable housing commitment it made would be reevaluated 
in light of the outcome of Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 
4 The moratorium was imposed by Ordinance 817 on September 28, 2006, two days after Mountain Central 
Ed. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008) was 
filed. This ordinance is not in the record, but its text also appears in Ordinance 828 enacted on October 12,2006, 
which amended Ordinance 827 to add an exception to the moratorium, R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 6). 
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2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008). Alpine thus proceeded with its 
acquisition of the Timbers with eyes wide open that the affordable housing ordinances were being 
challenged and that it might end up owning the building which it could then market without 
restrictions. No one-certainly not the City-required Alpine to purchase the Timbers. Now that 
the market has turned, Alpine seeks to pin its investment loss on the City. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON ApPEAL 
In addition to the issues identified in Appellants' Brief, the City identifies these issues: 
1. Was judicial review under LLUP A Alpine's exclusive remedy? 
2. Was there any taking of Alpine's property? 
3. Do equitable principles demand dismissal of Alpine's lawsuit? 
4. Is the City entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL 
The City seeks attorney fees on this appeal and opposes Alpine's request for fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ALPINE'S STATE AND FEDERAL CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY ITS FAILURE TO SEEK 
JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
The Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") authorizes judicial review of certain 
permitting decisions identified in Idaho Code §§ 67-6519 and 67-6521(1), including plats and 
planned unit developments.s Giltner Dairy v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633, 181 P.3d 1238, 
1241 (2008). The City's approval of the final plat and final plan for Alpine Village on August 23, 
2007, contained a finding (paragraphs 18 and 19 at page 3) that Alpine had submitted its revised 
Community Housing Plan providing six on-site units, 17 units at the Timbers, and an in lieu fee. 
R. Ex. II (Ex. 15). The approval also contained a requirement that the development agreements, 
5 The 2010 amendment to the statute, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175, has no bearing on this case. 
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including the Community Housing Plan, "be in final fonn, approved, and signed." Id., p. 6. This 
was final agency action reviewable under LLUP A. 6 
This Court has held repeatedly that when judicial review is available under LLUP A, it is 
the exclusive procedure for challenging the local government's action. In Bone v. City of 
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984), the Court admonished the plaintiff for trying to 
bypass the statute, declaring that LLUP A "is the exclusive source of appeal for adverse zoning 
actions." Bone, 107 Idaho at 848, 693 P.2d at 1050. The Court reached the same result in Curtis 
v. City of Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27,32-33, 720 P.2d 210,215-16 (1986) and Regan v. Kootenai 
County, 140 Idaho 721, 725-26, 100 P.3d 615,619-20 (2004). See also, Cobbley v. City of 
Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 133-34, 139 P.3d 732, 735-36 (2006) (applying the same principle in the 
context of judicial review of a road validation). 7 
These cases establish that if the Legislature provides a mechanism for judicial review, that 
procedure is exclusive, and a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a collateral 
attack. Regan, 140 Idaho at 726, 100 P .3d at 620. Because judicial review under LLUP A was 
available to Alpine and it failed to use it, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
6 Likewise, Alpine could have appealed the final plat approval of the Timbers on March 22,2007, which 
approved use of the Timbers under Ordinance 819. For that matter, Alpine could have appealed the preliminary plat 
approval of Alpine Village on December 13,2006. If a preliminary plat approval allows the applicant to take 
immediate steps to permanently alter the land before final approval, the preliminary plat approval is subject to appeal 
under LLUP A. Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Ed. o/Comm 'rs, Kootenai County, 133 Idaho 833, 837-39, 993 
P.2d 596,600-02 (1999). 
7 Idaho law, of course, is controlling. But it is interesting to note that Idaho law is consistent with the 
decisions reached by the high courts of other states, which have rejected end-runs around judicial review of allegedly 
illegal impact fees. Sold, Inc. v. Town a/Gorham, 868 A.2d 172, 176 (Maine 2005) ("When the time to file an appeal 
expired, the conditional approvals, including the impact fee requirements, became final, and were not subject to 
challenge.") (citation omitted); James v. County ojKitsap, 115 P.3d 286, 293-94 (Wash. 2005) ("The Developers here 
were provided, by statute, with several avenues to challenge the legality of the impact fees imposed by the County and 
comply with the procedural requirements under chapter 82.02 RCW and LUP A. ... However, rather than complying 
with either of these procedures provided by statute, the Developers waited almost three years before challenging the 
legality of the impact fees imposed by the County. ... [P]articularly with respect to impact fees, the purpose and 
policy of chapter 82.02 RCW in correlation with the procedural requirements of LLUP A ensure that local jurisdictions 
have timely notice of potential impact fee challenges. Without notice of these challenges, local jurisdictions would be 
less able to plan and fund construction of necessary public facilities."). 
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Alpine's civil action. 
This Court has recognized an exception to the exclusivity of judicial review under LLUP A 
where the plaintiff brings a facial challenge to the ordinance itself. McCuskey v. Canyon County 
("McCuskey F'), 123 Idaho 657, 660, 851 P.2d 953, 956 (1993) ("Thus, he is not arguing that the 
authorities made the wrong zoning decision, but rather he challenges the validity ofthe zoning 
ordinance."). But this is not a facial challenge. This case involves a one-off agreement involving 
a particular property. As Alpine agrees: "This claim has nothing to do with a 'facial challenge' to 
Ordinance 819." Alpine's summary judgment reply brief at 3, R. Vol. III, p. 460. See footnote 23 
at page 30. 
Nor does Idaho Code § 67-6521 (2)(b) exempt Alpine from exhaustion requirements or the 
obligation to seek judicial review. As this Court has noted before, this provision does not apply to 
all regulatory takings actions. "It only applies ifthe basis of the inverse condemnation claim is 
that a specific zoning action or permitting action restricting private property development is 
actually a regulatory action by local government deemed necessary to complete the development 
of the material resources of the state, or necessary for other public uses." KMST, LLC v. County of 
Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583,67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003) (internal quotations omitted).8 
8 The exemption in 67-6521(2)(b) is expressly tied to the constitutional provision on eminent domain, Idaho 
Const., art. I, § 14, which authorizes condemnation of property for any "use necessary to the complete development of 
the material resources of the state," which uses are "declared to be a public use." This sweeping condemnation 
power-which may be exercised not only by the govermnent but by private parties-has been recognized since 1906. 
Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426 (1906); Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 
556,155 P. 680 (1916), appeal dismissed, 244 U.S. 651. It appears that 67-652 1 (2)(b) is aimed at facilitating 
challenges to takings that are alleged not to be for a legitimate public use. The statutory language is obtuse, however, 
and resort to legislative history is justified. (See complete legislative history is set out as Addendum C to this brief.) 
The sponsor of House Bill 628, Rep. Jim D. Kempton, provided brief testimony on the measure to the House State 
Affairs Committee on January 30, 1996. His testimony was summarized in the record as follows, "This proposed 
legislation amends local govermnent land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies need not be 
exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court determination of public use under provisions of 
eminent domain." Virtually identical statements were made by Rep. Kempton before the same committee on 
February 13, 1996 and on March 1, 1996 to the Senate Local Govermnent and Taxation Committee. This language 
also corresponds, word for word, to the official statement of purpose for the bill (H.B. 628). At the March 1,1996 
hearing, Rep. Kempton handed out a packet of information including a copy ofIdaho Const., art. I, § 14, with the 
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II. ALPINE'S STATE LAW CLAIM IS BARRED BY ITS FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A 
NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
The District Court correctly dismissed Alpine's state law claim based on Alpine's failure 
to timely file a notice of claim. R. Vol. III, p. 527. Alpine acknowledges that Idaho Code § 50-
219 requires compliance with the notice requirement in 6-906 of the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("ITCA") for damage claims against municipalities and that it failed to timely provide such notice. 
Alpine nevertheless contends it is excused for two reasons. First, Alpine argues that 50-219 
incorporates only 6-906 (the ISO-day rule) and 6-907 (content of claim) but not 6-90S (prohibiting 
claims filed after ISO days) or any other provision of the ITCA. Second, Alpine argues that if 6-
90S does apply, it is not jurisdictional and Alpine's noncompliance may be excused because (1) 
the City'S refund of affordable housing fees under Ordinance S20 violates Alpine's equal 
protection rights and (2) the City should be estopped from raising this defense. 
A. 50-219 incorporates all ITCA provisions concerning the filing of claims. 
Alpine acknowledges that it must file a notice of claim within ISO days under 6-906, but, 
in a bizarre reading of 50-219, contends that there is no consequence for its failure to meet the 
deadline because 6-90S does not apply to it. Appellant's Brief at 22, 24. In other words, the 
notice requirement is optional. 
Alpine's interpretation is impossible to reconcile with the straightforward language of 
50-219. It states in full: "All claims for damages against a city must be filed as prescribed by 
chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code [the ITCA)." There is no reference to any specific section of the 
ITCA, and certainly no limitation to 6-906 and 6-907. The broad requirement that claims "must 
be filed as prescribed by" the ITCA naturally would include not only the provisions saying when 
relevant language underlined, as well as an exchange of correspondence with the Office of the Idaho Attorney General 
discussing this constitutional language. (The Deputy Attorney General approved of a change in the bill's language 
specifically including "other public uses.") That is the extent of the legislative history. 
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to provide notice (6-906) and what the notice should say (6-907), but the adjacent provision 
barring lawsuits by those who fail to provide timely notice (6-908).9 The Legislature's use of the 
phrase "must be filed" further reinforces the conclusion that there is a consequence for the failure 
to file. How Alpine reads 50-219 as an instruction to "file a notice within 180 days, but only if 
you feel like it" is difficult to fathom. 
Alpine relies upon Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990) for its 
proposition that the scope of 50-219 is limited to 6-906 and 6-907. This is a perversion of the 
holding in Sweitzer. In that case, the plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that 50-219, by its broad 
reference to the ITCA, effectively incorporated the act in its entirety, making 50-219 applicable 
only to tort claims and nullifying the plain language of 50-219 extending the notice requirement to 
all damage claims. This Court easily rejected that argument based on the plain language of 50-
219. 118 Idaho at 572, 798 P .2d at 31. In so holding, however, this Court did nothing to suggest 
that 6-908 was inapplicable or the notice requirement was optional or waivable. To the contrary, 
the Court said the purpose of 50-219 was to ensure that "the filing procedures for all claims 
against a municipality [are] uniform, standard and consistent." Id. Incorporating the requirement 
to file a notice but not the corresponding provision setting out the consequence of the failure to do 
so would hardly result in "uniform, standard and consistent" filing procedures. Indeed, the 
Sweitzer Court dismissed the lawsuit without any suggestion that it had any discretion in the 
matter. There is no explaining how Alpine can read Sweitzer as an endorsement of its theory that 
failure to file a timely notice may be overlooked. Alpine also ignores BHA Investments, Inc. v. 
City a/Boise ("BHA 11'),141 Idaho 168, 174-76, 108 P.3d 315, 321-23 (2004), another case in 
9 It would include other provisions, too, that are essential to the notice of claim process, including 6-902(7) 
(the definition of "claim"), 6-906A ("time for filing claims by minors"), 6-909 (time limit for the governmental entity 
to act upon a claim), and 6-910 (right to file an action on a denied claim). 
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which this Court declined to recognize excuses for failure to comply. 
B. Alpine's failure to comply with section 50-219 is jurisdictional. 
While Alpine concedes that the Idaho Court of Appeals found the failure to comply with 
the notice requirement of the ITCA to be a jurisdictional defect, Alpine claims that "this Court has 
never directly considered the issue." Appellant's Brief at 17. Not so. In holding that the failure to 
file a claim is a jurisdictional defect, the Madsen court relied upon this Court's decision in 
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987): "Compliance with 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act notice requirement is a mandatory condition precedent in bringing suit, 
the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate .... In summary, McQuillen's 
negligent issuance claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act is absolutely barred for failure to timely 
comply with the 120-day notice requirement." (Emphasis supplied.) While the McQuillen court 
did not explicitly state that the failure to file a claim was a jurisdictional defect, that is the clear 
import of the quoted statements. In the context of exhaustion of administrative remedies, this 
Court has also described the failure to satisfy a mandatory condition precedent as depriving a court 
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Petition of Felton, 79 Idaho 325, 316 P .2d 1064 (1957) (failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies in tax appeal); Fairway Dev. Co. v. Bannock County, 119 
Idaho 121, 124,804 P.2d 294,297 (1990); Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 724, 100 
P.3d 615, 618 (2004); Parkv. Banbury, 143 Idaho 576,149 P.3d 851 (2006). 
Alpine says it could not find any Idaho cases other than Madsen holding that failure to file 
a claim is jurisdictional. Appellant's Brief at 18, n.11. It did not dig very deep. In Allied Bail 
Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 409-10, 258 P .3d 340, 344-45 (2011), the 
district court ruled that plaintiff s failure to provide notice under the ITCA of its constitutional and 
other claims deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. This Court affirmed, quoting the "condition 
precedent" language from McQuillen. Earlier, in Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho 523, 527, 777 
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P.2d 1196, 1200 (1989), this Court held that notice "is prerequisite to maintaining a claim" and 
failure to file a timely notice means that "the claim against the Grimes failed for lack of 
jurisdiction." In Greenwade v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 119 Idaho 501,503,808 P.2d 420, 422 
(Ct. App. 1991), the district court found that plaintiffs failure to comply with the ITCA deprived 
it of jurisdiction. This Court affirmed. "When it is read together with I.C. § 6-908, it is clear that 
failure to comply with the notice requirement bars a SUit."IO 
C. Even if timely notice were not a jurisdictional requirement, Alpine's 
constitutional and equitable arguments lack merit. 
(1) The City's refund of fees paid under Ordinance 820 does not 
violate equal protection. 
Alpine contends that the City discriminated among developers by enacting a resolution to 
refund fees paid under Ordinance 820 while providing no refunds under Ordinance 819. 
Appellant's Briefat 24-28. This, says Alpine, violated the Equal Protection Clause ofthe 
Constitution. As Alpine recognizes, the City's action here must be analyzed under the rational 
basis test, a minimal standard requiring only that the classification be rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective. Appellant's Brief at 27, citing, inter alia, Bon Appetit Gourmet 
Foods, Inc. v. State Dept. of Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 793 P.2d 675 (1990). As stated by the 
United States Supreme Court: "State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their 
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
Alpine's equal protection argument collapses because there was no disparate treatment. 
The simple reason the City did not refund money or return property under Ordinance 819 was that 
10 Since all the Idaho cases run against it, Alpine discusses a number of cases from foreign jurisdictions 
holding that failure to comply is procedural rather than jurisdictional. Appellant's Brief at 20-21. The short and 
sufficient answer is that these authorities conflict with the Idaho cases discussed above. 
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"no properties or fees were ever collected by the City under that Ordinance." R. Vol. II, p. 297, ~ 
5. At the time of Mountain Central, only two developers were obligated to provide community 
housing under Ordinance 819 (Alpine and one other). !d. ~ 6. After Mountain Central, the City 
promptly released both developers from those restrictions. Id., pp. 297-98, ~~ 7-8. So there was 
no reason to enact a resolution for Ordinance 819 like the one adopted for Ordinance 820. In other 
words, Alpine and the other developer received the equivalent of a fun refund. The City's action 
with respect to fees paid under Ordinance 820 and property restrictions under 819 was the same. 
The City did not reimburse developers under Ordinance 819 for their missed opportunities while 
their money was held by the City. Nor did the City insulate Alpine or the other developer under 
Ordinance 819 from market fluctuations. The City simply gave the developers their property 
back. This was an even-handed and rational response. Alpine may wish that the City had done 
more, but it is hardly in a position to complain of unequal treatment. 
(2) Alpine cannot establish the essential elements of equitable 
estoppel. 
Next, Alpine contends that quasi-estoppel applies here and bars the City from raising the 
I80-day notice requirement. Appellant's Brief at 28-29. Alpine's theory also falters out of the 
gate because estoppel cannot operate to grant subject matter jurisdiction, which, as we have noted 
above, is lacking here. "Estoppel is not appropriate where jurisdiction is at issue." City of Eagle 
v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 454, 247 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2011). 
Alpine then fails to inform the Court that estoppel applies against an entity acting in a 
governmental capacity only if there is a showing of "exigent circumstances." Harrell v. The City 
of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2d 470 (1973); Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of 
Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995). None are even alleged here. 
Alpine then failed to prove the basic elements of quasi-estoppel. Quasi-estoppel applies 
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when it would be unconscionable to pennit a party to maintain a position that is inconsistent with 
one in which the party acquiesced or pursuant to which the party accepted a benefit. Mitchell v. 
Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715,874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994); Willigv. State, Dep't of Health & 
Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). Alpine contends that the City changed its 
position by refunding money it collected under Ordinance 820 while declining to further 
reimburse Alpine after releasing it from restrictions imposed under Ordinance 819. Alpine may 
disagree with that decision, but there has been no change in the City's position. Ifthe City had 
initially offered to waive Alpine's deadlines and then changed its mind, that might be different. 
But no refund resolution ever applied to Alpine. Indeed, it is Alpine that has changed its position! 
As shown in an email from counsel for Alpine to the City on April 26, 2008 (two days after the 
City repealed Ordinance 819), Alpine sought nothing more than a release of the housing 
restrictions on the Timbers-which the City promptly provided. R. Vol. III, pp. 422-26. This is 
further explained in the accompanying Affidavit of William F. Nichols in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R. Vol. III, pp. 417-21. It was only years later that Alpine changed its 
position and demanded money in addition to the release. 
Nor can Alpine show that it relied to its detriment on a reasonable assumption that the City 
would waive the l80-day rule. If Alpine really thought that the City's action in 2008 (refunding 
fees under Ordinance 820) meant that it was waiving the ITCA and welcoming lawsuits under 
Ordinance 819, why didn't Alpine take advantage of the City's "waiver"? It is obvious that 
Alpine dreamed up this lawsuit years later, not as a result of some revoked promise by the City 
that it could take its time in filing suit. In sum, Alpine has not been disadvantaged or induced to 
change its position as a result of any action or representation by the City. 
Alpine concedes that its quasi-estoppel argument is based on "[t]he identical set of facts 
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which form the basis for the equal protection defense." Appellant's Brie/at 28. Thus, if 
applicable at all, it fails for the same reasons discussed above. In short, the City acted rationally 
and fairly in refunding fees and releasing developers from restrictions on their property. To 
suggest that the City's action is unconscionable does not pass the straight face test. I I 
III. ALPINE'S STATE LAW CLAIMS MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE ITCA's TWO-YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The City calls to the Court's attention, as it did in district court, that the ITCA contains its 
own two-year statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 6-911. The plain language of Idaho Code § 50-
219 broadly applies all of the ITCA's requirements governing the filing of damage actions against 
cities: "All claims for damages against a city must be filed as prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, 
Idaho Code." This would appear to embrace not only the I80-day notice requirement, but the 
statute oflimitations. The City has found no case in which this argument has been presented. 
Despite the lack of precedent, the argument seems to make sense. 
IV. IN ANY EVENT, ALPINE'S STATE CLAIMS ARE UNTIMELY UNDER IDAHO'S FOUR-
YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Alpine acknowledges that its state takings claim is subject to Idaho's residual four-year 
statute oflimitations, Idaho Code § 5-224. Appellant's Brie/at 29. Thus, if Alpine's cause of 
action accrued before December 10, 2006, its lawsuit is untimely. 
In fact, Alpine's cause of action accrued about six months earlier, on June 20, 2006, the 
day it filed its development applications. Alpine acknowledged in its complaint that it knew at the 
time of its applications that it was required to contribute property to community housing. 
"Ordinance 819 required any applicant seeking the City's approval of a new residential 
II As the final kick to this dead horse, even if estoppel were applied here, it would only restart the clock and 
extend the deadline to 180 days from the date that the City stopped accepting refund requests. Since that date was 
December 31, 2009 (Appellant's Brief at 25), the new deadline for filing the notice of claim would be June 29, 2010. 
Thus, even under Alpine's estoppel theory, its action is still barred because Alpine did not submit its claim to the City 
until November 15,2010. 
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subdivision or condominium project to submit and Inc1usionary Housing Plan (a.k.a. Community 
Housing Plan) with the initial subdivision application." Second Amended Complaint ~ 8, R. Vol. 
II, p. 200. "On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff submitted the applications to the City which were required 
by the McCall City Code for preliminary approval of the Alpine Village project. ... As required 
by Ordinance 819, a Community Housing Plan was submitted with the Preliminary Applications." 
Id. ~ 10, R. Vol. II. p. 201. Indeed, Alpine submitted its proposed housing plan June 4,2006, a 
couple weeks in advance of the applications. R. Ex. II (Ex. 4).12 Alpine admits that the housing 
obligation was controlled by the Ordinance's fixed formula based on "a specified percentage of 
the total units in the subdivision." Appellant's Brie/at 3. The ordinance provided some leeway as 
to how the housing contribution is made (onsite versus offsite versus in lieu payments), but it 
provided no flexibility or way around the requirement that the contribution be made. Thus, since 
Alpine knew how many units it wanted to build, it was a simple matter to understand the extent of 
its obligation on June 20, 2006. 
It makes no difference whether the exaction ultimately would be paid in the form of mobile 
home sites, the Timbers, on-site units, or in lieu cash. Whatever form it took, the exaction was 
equally unconstitutional. Alpine could have initiated suit right then-which, as a facial challenge 
to the ordinance, would have been permissible even before the City acted on the applications. 
McCuskey I, 123 Idaho at 660,851 P.2d at 956. After all, the plaintiff in Mountain Central did 
not wait until its members filed applications, and it had a cause of action. 
Alpine's position that it had no cause of action until the City approved use of the Timbers 
runs counter to a mountain of appellate precedent. A cause of action arises as soon as it becomes 
12 "Alpine proposed to satisfy the requirements of Ordinance 819 by providing six community housing units 
on site and by converting 16 mobile home spaces which were owned by Alpine to Community Housing Rental Units." 
Alpine's Opening Trial Briefat 3, R. Vol. II, p. 368. 
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apparent that the government is requiring an unlawful and uncompensated conveyance or 
impairment of a person's property. In the words of this Court, "The time of taking occurs, and 
hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use 
and enjoyment ofthe property becomes apparent." McCuskey v. Canyon County Comm 'rs 
("McCuskey 11'), 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996). 
But "full extent" does not mean that the exact quantity of the regulatory taking be known. 
McCuskey contended that the statute did not begin to run until the Court ruled the county's zoning 
action illegal, because only then did he know the full extent of damages for the temporary taking. 
The Court rejected this argument, explaining that the lack of quantification ofthe loss is not an 
excuse for delay in filing the lawsuit: 
Moreover, it is well settled that uncertainty as to the amount of 
damages cannot bar recovery so long as the underlying cause of 
action is determined. Besides, although McCuskey may not have 
known the full extent of his damages at the time the stop-work order 
was issued, he would have known with certainty what they were 
once a taking had been finally adjudicated. 
McCuskey 11, 128 Idaho at 218, 912 P .2d at 1 05 (citation omitted). Thus, the clock begins to run 
when interference with plaintiffs property is sufficiently apparent that a cause of action has 
arisen, even if the damages are not yet quantified. On June 20,2006, it was fully apparent and 
absolutely certain that some property would be taken, thus giving Alpine a cause of action. 
Indeed, ifhad been brought in a timely fashion, the City might have been barred from the taking 
and there would have been no need to quantify anything. 
In a case decided the same year as McCuskey 11, this Court explained that the statute began 
to run "when the impairment was of such a degree and kind that substantial interference with 
Wadsworth's property interest became apparent." Wadsworth v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 443, 915 P.2d 1,5 (1996). In Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1506450_10.4432-8 
Page 21 of49 
644 P.2d 1333, 1338 (1982), this Court held that the statute began to run on the date ofa meeting 
between parties at which time there was "recognition of the severity of the problem." In another 
case, the Court explained, "The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact 
determination, is to be fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and 
kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became apparent." 
Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (inverse 
condemnation based on airport expansion). 
Despite this clear authority, Alpine asserts that its claim did not accrue until December 13, 
2007 (the date of the Alpine Development Agreement) or "at the earliest" March 22, 2007 (when 
the City approved Alpine's proposal to dedicate the Timbers). Appellant's Brie/at 31. In support 
of this contention, Alpine relies on City o/Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 
310 (2006). But Simpson does not support Alpine's conclusion. 
Simpson involved landowners who built fences on their lakefront property. The City of 
Coeur d' Alene determined that this violated city ordinances and demanded that the fences be 
removed. The Simpsons refused, and the City sought an injunction. The landowners 
counterclaimed for inverse condemnation. Although the Simpson's counter-claim came in 1998, 
just a year or so after they installed the fences in 1997, the City said that was too late because their 
cause of action arose when the ordinances were first enacted. The Court disagreed. Simpson, 142 
Idaho at 846, 136 P.3d at 317 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 553 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001). 
The Court held that the statute oflimitations did not begin to run upon enactment of the applicable 
ordinances, but only when Coeur d' Alene brought an enforcement action against the landowners. 
This makes sense. The ordinances had been on the books for decades, long before the Simpsons 
built the fences. Moreover, there was uncertainty until just before the litigation about which 
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ordinances were in effect. Simpson, 142 Idaho at 843 n.l, 136 P .3d at 314, n.l. Finally, the city's 
enforcement action involved an exercise of discretion. "More important, however, is the fact that 
the City brought this action in 1998 to require removal of the fences .... " Simpson, 142 Idaho at 
846, 136 P.3d at 317. 
The situation in the instant case is fundamentally different. First, the City is not alleging 
that Alpine's cause of action accrued on the enactment of Ordinance 819. Second, the City did not 
initiate this matter; Alpine did, on June 20, 2006. Third, Ordinance 819 is non-discretionary and 
sets out a fixed formula for community housing. Accordingly, it was apparent as soon as Alpine's 
application was filed that there was a taking. 13 
The U.S. Supreme Court made this distinction clear in Palazzolo. The Court recognized 
and contrasted cases in which the regulatory action involved no discretion. "While a landowner 
must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear that 
the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses ofthe property 
are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened." 
Palazzolo, 53 U.S. at 620. 
These cases make clear what really should be obvious. A cause of action does not arise 
instantly and automatically upon enactment of an ordinance. That ordinance must be applied to 
someone in order join the issue. That occurred here when Alpine filed its applications on June 20, 
2006, which included a housing plan mandated by Ordinance 819. 
V. ALPINE'S CLAIMS ALSO FAIL THE EXHAUSTION AND VOLUNTARY ACTION TESTS 
ESTABLISHED UNDERKMST. 
As documented above, the conveyance of property to the City was proposed by Alpine 
l3 The ordinance set out the fonnula for fees with particularity. Even if it did not, that would not matter. 
Alpine's case is not premised on a regulatory taking that "went too far." Rather, it is based on a per se violation of 
Idaho's constitutional provision dealing with illegal taxes. Thus, one penny is enough for the action to accrue. 
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itself in its June 20, 2006 applications. When the City balked at the proposal to satisfy the 
ordinance with mobile home sites, Alpine proposed a mix of on-site units, the Timbers, and an in 
lieu fee. When the City agreed, Alpine entered into development agreements. It never sought an 
amendment of the planned unit development (as provided in the McCall Zoning Ordinance 
§ 3.10.12, reproduced in Addendum D), or judicial review under LLUP A. 
This falls within the rule governing voluntary actions established by this Court in KMST, 
LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003). In that case, a developer brought two 
claims against the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), one in connection with ACHD's road 
dedication requirement and another in connection with ACHD's impact fees. Other claims against 
Ada County were not pursued on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed both ACHD claims 
on technical grounds- exhaustion (as to the impact fees) and ripeness (as to the road dedication). 
Nevertheless, the KMST Court went on to opine as to the merits ofthe takings claim on the road 
dedication saying that this was not a taking because it was voluntarily offered. In essence, it was a 
not a "taking" but a "giving" (our words, not the Court's). The exhaustion and voluntariness 
issues are discussed in tum below. 
A. Alpine did not exhaust its administrative remedies. 
(1) Alpine failed to exhaust. 
"As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to court 
to challenge the validity of administrative acts. ... KMST had the opportunity to challenge the 
calculation ofthe impact fees administratively, and it chose not to do so." KMST, 138 Idaho at 
583,67 P.3d at 62. Alpine is in the same position. Alpine could have informed the City that 
Ordinance 819 was unlawful and that it would not agree to contribute property for affordable 
housing. Instead, Alpine proposed and ultimately signed two development agreements. By failing 
to object, or to seek an amendment (as provided in the McCall Zoning Ordinance § 3.10.12, 
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reproduced in Addendum D), Alpine failed to exhaust. 
(2) Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply here. 
Alpine seeks to hide behind the two exceptions to the requirement of administrative 
exhaustion: "(a) when the interests of justice so require, and (b) when the agency acted outside its 
authority," KMST, LLC v. County 0/ Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003). Appellant's 
Brie/at 35. 
(a) Alpine cannot meet the "interests of justice" exception. 
Alpine presents no argument on this exception, other than saying, "It certainly could be 
argued." Appellant's Brie/at 35. In any event, the argument fails. This Court explained: 
"Typically this situation occurs where irreparable harm results from the administrative process 
itself. The standard may also be satisfied by showing that the agency lacks power to grant the 
requested relief, i.e., that exhaustion would be futile." Park, 143 Idaho at 581, 149 P .3d at 856 
(citations omitted). Alpine has pointed to nothing in the record showing it would have been futile 
for it to have worked with the City to come up with some alternative to its buying the Timbers 
before the decision was rendered in Mountain Central. Nor has Alpine identified irreparable harm 
that would have occurred to it had it exhausted its administrative remedies. 
(b) The "outside the agency's authority" exception does not 
apply. 
It is doubtful that this second exception applies at all to "as applied" challenges. A review 
of this Court's decisions strongly suggests that this exception applies only to facial challenges. 14 
14 After all, KMSTwas an "as applied" takings case, just like this one. If the mere allegation of an 
uncompensated taking was sufficient to trigger the exception in an "as applied" challenge, then the exception would 
have applied there. Instead, this Court recited the exceptions and declared that they did not apply. KMST, 138 Idaho 
583, 67 P.3d 62. A similar result obtained in Park. "Even if these claims are interpreted as a constitutional challenge 
to the validity of a statute or rule, it does not follow that exhaustion is waived. Although facial challenges to the 
validity of a statute or ordinance need not proceed through administrative channels, as-applied challenges may be 
required to do so." Park, 143 Idaho at 581-82, 149 P.3d at 856-57. White also involved an "as applied" constitutional 
challenge to the issuance of a conditional use permit. The Court did not apply any exceptions to the exhaustion rule. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
1506450_10,4432·8 
Page 25 of49 
This makes sense, because further administrative process would add nothing to the purely legal 
question presented in a facial challenge. In contrast, "a district court cannot properly engage in an 
'as applied' constitutional challenge until a complete factual record has been developed." 
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. IDWR, 143 Idaho 862,872, 154 P.3d 433,443 (2007). 
"Thus, the exception for when an agency exceeds its authority does not apply unless the CM Rules 
are facially unconstitutional." Id. IS 
Even if the "outside the agency's authority" exception does apply to "as applied" 
challenges like this one, the test is not satisfied here. The City was not "palpably without 
jurisdiction." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978). 
The City was acting within its authority under LLUP A to issue planned unit development and 
subdivision permits. Only when an entity strays entirely outside its regulatory authority (for 
instance, if a city sought to rule on the validity of water rights or otherwise invade the domain of 
other regulatory agencies) may the action be challenged without exhaustion. Where, as here, the 
entity has regulatory authority over the subject matter and the only question is whether it has 
"We also conclude that the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine do not apply to the present case where 
the question of a conditional use permit' is one within the zoning authority's specialization and when the 
administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief. '" White v. Bannock County 
Comm'rs, l39 Idaho 396, 402, 80 P.3d 332,338 (2003). Similarly, in Palmer v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs of Blaine 
County, 117 Idaho 562, 564, 790 P.2d 343,345 (1990), the Court applied no exception to the exhaustion requirement 
in that case where "there is no challenge to the validity of Ordinance 77-5 .... This Court has frequently announced 
that except in unusual circumstances parties must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial 
recourse." In Service Employees Int 'I Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 762, 683 
P.2d 404,410 (1984), this Court said: "Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary for us to address appellant's 
constitutional claims. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required before constitutional claims are 
raised." This, too, was an "as applied" constitutional challenge in which the Court found it unnecessary to address the 
exceptions to the exhaustion rule. 
15 In American Falls Reservoir, the Court explained that trying to figure out whether an agency acted outside 
its authority is essentially a circular argument. Id. Thus, a plaintiff may not avoid the exhaustion requirement merely 
by alleging that the agency's action is unconstitutional and therefore beyond the scope of its authority. If that were the 
case, exhaustion would never be required in a constitutional challenge. Rather, for the exception to apply, the plaintiff 
must show that the agency had no authority over the subject matter at all. 
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exercised that authority constitutionally, the exception does not apply and exhaustion is required. 16 
B. Alpine's actions were voluntary. 
The KMSTCourt went on to say that even if ACHD's recommendation had been a final 
decision, it would not have constituted a taking because the dedication was voluntary. In a pre-
application meeting with ACHD staff, KMST was advised that staff would recommend a 
requirement of a road dedication. In order to move things along, KMST agreed to the dedication 
and included it in its application. This proved fatal to KMST's taking claim. "KMST's property 
was not taken. It voluntarily decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to speed approval 
of its development. Having done so, it cannot now claim that its property was 'taken. ,,, KMST, 
138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61 (emphasis supplied). This language is significant because it shows 
that it makes no difference that the developer was motivated by a desire to speed the processing of 
its application; the developer's action is still deemed voluntary even ifit was not motivated by 
altruism. 
Alpine could have told the City: "We will not give you anything. You cannot require 
this." Instead, Alpine proposed a housing contribution as part of its applications, later offered a 
revised plan involving the Timbers, raised no objections, sought no amendment during the 
permitting process, and signed the development agreements. Under KMST, Alpine cannot now be 
heard to complain that the payments it agreed to make were an unlawful taking. 17 
16 Although from another jurisdiction, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Maine in Sold, Inc. v. Town of 
Gorham, 868 A.2d 172 (Maine 2005) is compelling and on point. Maine law recognizes the same exception to the 
exhaustion requirement for government actions that are "beyond the jurisdiction or authority of the administrative 
body to act." Sold, Inc., 868 A.2d at 176. In that case, the Court found that the imposition of impact fees as 
conditions of approval was within the jurisdiction and authority of the town, even in the face of statutory and 
constitutional challenges. "Here, there is no dispute that the Planning Board had authority to consider, approve, and 
attach conditions to approvals of subdivisions. ... Such challenges are the essence of matters that must be brought 
pursuant to Rule 80B to question whether the particular action of a municipal administrative agency is consistent with 
the requirements oflaw." Id. 
17 The recognition in KMSTthat voluntary actions do not give rise to takings is not undercut by the Court's 
holding in BRA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise ("BRA II "), 141 Idaho 168, 108 P .3d 315 (2004), which held that 
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VI. ALPINE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RELEASE IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENTS. 
As part of its two development agreements with the City, Alpine waived and released the 
City from claims relating to the Mountain Centra/litigation. Article VII of the Alpine 
Development Agreement reads in full: 18 
Alpine Village's approved Community Housing Plan is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Alpine Village waives and releases 
the City from any claims whatsoever regarding or stemming from 
the pending litigation between the Mountain Central Board of 
Realtors and the City (ie. Mountain Central Board of Realtors, et al 
v. City of McCall, et aI, Valley County Case Number CV-2006-490-
C) as to Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant to this 
Plan prior to the final disposition of such litigation. The Plan will be 
reviewed and modified, as necessary, to comply with the final 
disposition of the litigation as to any Community Housing Units 
which have not been sold prior to the final disposition of the 
Ii tigation. 
This provision fully allocated the risk that Mountain Central would overturn Ordinance 
819, providing assurances to both parties. First, it provided that if Alpine sold any units below 
cost prior to the final resolution of Mountain Central, Alpine would shoulder that loss. As it turns 
out, none were sold. 19 Second, the language addressed what would happen to the unsold units 
after Mountain Central. As to these, the City was obliged to agree to an appropriate modification 
plaintiffs are not required to pay under protest as a prerequisite to challenging an unlawful tax. The BHA II case 
involved a transfer fee charged by the City of Boise on liquor licenses. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claim 
because they had not paid the fee under protest. This was based on an old line of cases (e.g., Walker v. Wedgwood,64 
Idaho 285, 130 P.2d 856 (1942)) holding that plaintiffs must pay taxes under protest to preserve the right to request a 
refund. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the requirement that taxes be paid under protest applies to only to 
lawful taxes. BHA II, 141 Idaho at 176, 108 P.3d at 323. This has no applicability here. The City is not arguing that 
Alpine should have paid under protest because the development agreements constituted a tax. It is arguing, under 
KMST, that Alpine cannot claim a taking where it agreed to the contract. Indeed, in KMST the Court noted one of the 
reasons that it was clear that plaintiff s action was voluntary was because they did not pay the impact fees under 
protest. KMST, 138 Idaho at 583, 67 P.3d at 62. 
18 This release language is repeated verbatim in Article IV of the Timbers Development Agreement at 2. R. 
Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 10). 
19 "None of the condominium units which were acquired and deed restricted by Alpine in compliance with 
Ordinance 819 sold prior to the final disposition of the Mountain Central litigation." Appellant's Brief at 4. 
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of the housing plan reflecting the outcome of the case. Thus, if the ordinance was declared 
entirely invalid, the City would be obligated to entirely remove the housing restrictions. That is 
alL The contract did not provide, and the parties obviously did not expect, that the City would be 
obligated to reimburse Alpine for any lost opportunity costs or reduction in market value 
occurring during the pendency of the litigation. The City reasonably relied on this language to 
protect it. After all, it had enacted a moratorium on all new development applications in response 
to Mountain Central. (See footnote 4 at page 9.) Rather than delaying or denying pending 
applications, this contract language was intended to allow applications like Alpine's to proceed 
without financial risk to the City. It is safe to assume that the City would never have entered into 
this contract and approved the project if it thought that Alpine reserved the right to sue the City 
despite the City's compliance with the tenns ofthe deal. 
When the Mountain Central plaintiffs prevailed, the City released Alpine from all the 
housing plan restrictions.2o The City complied fully and in good faith with its agreement, and 
Alpine got exactly what it bargained for. This Court should not allow Alpine to engage in this end 
run around its contract to obtain something more than the contract contemplated. 
VII. ALPINE'S FEDERAL TAKING CLAIM IS UNRIPE At~D FORFEITED UNDER 
WILLIAMSON COUNTY AND, IN ANY EVENT, UNTIMELY. 
In addition to the defenses discussed above, the following defenses are applicable 
exclusively to the federal claims. First, Alpine fails the two ripeness tests established in 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). It failed prong one (the "final decision" test) because, as the District Court said, "Alpine 
failed to contest the Development Agreement." Memorandum Decision at 12, R. Vol. III, p. 530. 
20 The amendment to the Alpine Development Agreement provided: "Article VII of the Agreement [the 
article imposing housing restrictions] shall be deleted in its entirety and Alpine Village shall be and hereby is released 
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It failed prong two (the "state remedies" test) because, as the District Court said, "Alpine failed to 
seek judicial review." !d. at 13, R. Vol. III, p. 531. This resulted in Alpine forfeiting its claim. 
Id. Second, its federal claims are tardy under the two-year statute oflimitations. 
A. Alpine's federal claims are blocked by both "ripeness" tests. 
(1) Prong one: The "final decision" requirement 
Williamson County established two special ripeness tests for plaintiffs alleging an 
uncompensated taking under the federal Constitution. The first test is that the decision appealed 
from must have been a "final decision." That is, the defendant agency must have "arrived at a 
final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue." Williamson County, 
473 U.S. at 191.21 
In Williamson County, the plaintiff failed to seek a variance. Williamson County at 190. 
But the "final decision" requirement is not limited to variances. The Supreme Court explained 
why requiring the plaintiff to probe the decision maker in this way is a fundamental prerequisite to 
a takings claim. "Our reluctance to examine taking claims until such a final decision has been 
made is compelled by the very nature ofthe inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause." 
Williamson County at 190 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 
452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). The message of these four Supreme Court cases is that 
from any requirement to provide[] Community Housing for or related to the PUD." R. Vol. II, p. 290. The 
amendment to the Timbers Development Agreement did the same thing. Addendum B to this brief at 2. 
21 Alpine incorrectly characterizes this as an exhaustion requirement, Appellant's Brie/at 34-35. The 
Williamson County Court took pains to explain that it was requiring ripeness, not exhaustion. "While the policies 
underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial 
decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion 
requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of 
an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate." 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193 (emphasis supplied). Exhaustion is relevant to this case (see discussion at section 
V.A at page 30). Indeed, some of the facts showing failure to exhaust may also show lack of ripeness. But these are 
separate legal requirements. 
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developers must take full advantage of opportunities for securing relief from the local governing 
body-whether that be by means of a variance or otherwise. The developer certainly cannot offer 
up or agree by contract to the very thing it claims is being taken. Otherwise, it is impossible to 
know how much was "taken" and how much was "given." 
Here, Alpine failed to object to the arrangement it worked out with the City for use of the 
Timbers. As the District Court explained: 
In this case, Alpine failed to contest the Development Agreement. 
In this case, Alpine was required to raise their objections with the 
local government in a timely and meaningful way in order to set up 
their claim that the exaction was voluntary. Alpine did not lodge an 
objection with the City over its denial of converting Alpine's motor 
[mobile J home lots to community housing. In this case, Alpine 
proposed, executed and carried out a development agreement. Thus 
the Court will find that there was no final decision as spelled out in 
Williamson County. 
Memorandum Decision at 12-13, R. Vol. III, p. 530-31. 
The District Court is exactly right. Alpine premises its lawsuit on the fact that "[ u Jnder 
the perceived authority of Ordinance 819, the City required Alpine to spend in excess of two 
million dollars to provide low income housing for a public use." Appellant's Brie/at 14. Given 
that Alpine itself proposed using the Timbers, how can the Court determine whether purchasing 
the Timbers was compelled? Might the City have agreed to let the development proceed based on, 
for instance, Alpine obtaining an option to acquire the Timbers later in the event that Ordinance 
819 was upheld? Alternatively, as the ordinance makes clear, Alpine could have committed more 
of its on-site units and/or provided a greater in lieu payment, either of which could have been 
released or refunded in the event Ordinance 819 was overturned. Instead, Alpine itself admits that 
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it, not the City, came up with idea of using the Timbers.22 Due to Alpine's failure to probe 
alternatives to proceeding with the Timbers (just as the plaintiff in Williamson County failed to 
seek a variance), prong one of Williamson County is not met.23 
(2) Prong two: The requirement to employ state remedies. 
Under the second prong of Williamson County, the property owner must "seek 
compensation through the procedures the State has provided" before litigating the federal claim. 
Williamson County at 194. "[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just 
compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until 
it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." Williamson County at 195. Idaho 
provided Alpine with a means for challenging a taking (aka inverse condemnation) by seeking 
judicial review under LLUPA within 28 days ofthe approval of its development permits with 
unacceptable conditions. In the alternative, if this were framed as a facial challenge, Alpine could 
have filed a separate lawsuit attacking ordinance and/or the development agreements. (If seeking 
prospective relief instead of damages, the l80-day notice requirement would not have applied.) 
Alpine failed to do either, and now it is too late. Accordingly, Alpine has forfeited its federal 
claim under prong two of Williamson County. 
22 "Alpine submitted a revised Community Housing Plan, which proposed to satisfy the requirements of 
Ordinance 819 for Alpine Village by providing six units on site, all seventeen of the Timbers units as off-site units, 
and the remaining required.5 units by paying an 'in lieu' fee to the City." Appellant's Briefat 5. 
23 In pressing this point on appeal, the City adopts the reasoning of the District Court. Initially, the City had 
thought of this as a facial challenge, based on the fact that Ordinance 819 was found to be facially unconstitutional. 
Facial challenges are exempt from prong one. The District Court, however, found that this is an as-applied challenge, 
hence making prong one applicable. Memorandum Decision at 12, R. Vol. III, 530. This is consistent, by the way, 
with Alpine's position that this is an as-applied challenge. "Alpine's state takings claim is clearly that the application 
of this indisputably void and unconstitutional ordinance to Alpine, in the manner in which it was imposed by the City, 
effectuated a compensable taking. This claim has nothing to do with a 'facial challenge' to Ordinance 819." Alpine's 
summary judgment reply brief at 3, R. Vol. III, p. 460 (emphasis original). The points made by both Alpine and the 
District Court have merit. While this case involves a facially invalid ordinance, the crux of the case is Alpine's 
contention that the City applied the ordinance to Alpine in a manner that prevented Alpine from being fully 
compensated once the ordinance was overturned. Hence, the City agrees with Alpine and the District Court that this is 
an as-applied challenge. 
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals considered an identical situation in Pascoag Reservoir 
& Dam v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (1 st Cir. 2003). In that case, the plaintiff argued that it was 
excused from prong two on futility grounds in light of the fact that it had missed the statute of 
limitations deadline. The court soundly rejected this argument. A plaintiff may not base futility 
on self-inflicted wounds. The court explained: "Adequate remedies were available to Pascoag; it 
simply ignored those remedies until it was too late. By failing to bring a timely state cause of 
action, Pascoag forfeited its federal claim." Pascoag, 337 F .3d at 94 (emphasis supplied). The 
court continued, "The Williamson County 'ripeness' requirements will never be met in this case, 
because the state statute oflimitations has run on Pascoag's inverse condemnation claim. By 
failing to bring its state claim within the statute oflimitations period, Pascoag forfeited its federal 
claim." Pascoag, 337 F.3d at 95 (emphasis original) (citing Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F.3d 
285,286 (ih Cir. 1993) and Vandor, Inc. v. Militello, 301 F.3d 37,39 (2nd Cir. 2002)). This is 
exactly what happened here. As these cases from three federal circuits point out, a takings 
plaintifflike Alpine who fails to timely bring a state claim can never satisfy the second prong of 
Williamson County, and its federal claim is therefore forever barred. 
For this reason, even if Alpine had brought its federal claim between June 11,2008 and 
June 11, 2010 (that is, within the federal two-year statute of limitations as applied by the District 
Court, as discussed below), it still would have been barred. 
Alpine says it satisfied the second prong by bringing this very suit. Appellant's Brief at 41 
("Thus, it is entirely appropriate for Alpine to bring both the State and Federal Constitutional 
Claims in this action .... "). This misses the point. If this lawsuit had been properly filed (e.g., in 
a timely judicial review, a non-damage-based facial challenge to the ordinance, or a damage-based 
facial challenge brought within 180 days of accrual), then Alpine could then have presented the 
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state and federal claims simultaneously. But Alpine did not do that, and now it is too late to ripen 
the federal claim. 
B. Alpine missed the statute of limitations applicable to its federal claims. 
(1) Both of Alpine's federal claims are subject to the two-year 
statute of limitation. 
Where there is no statute providing a private cause of action, federal constitutional 
challenges may be presented directly under the federal Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents a/Fed. Bureau a/Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). These are known as Bivens 
actions. However, where a private cause of action is established by statute, it is exclusive and a 
plaintiff may not evade its restrictions be pleading directly under the Constitution. Azul-Pacifico, 
Inc. v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993); 
Martinez v. City a/Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373,1382 (9th Cir 1998); "Hacienda Valley Mobile 
Estates v. City a/Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1041 
(2004 and 2005). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is such a private cause of action and, hence, is Alpine's only 
means of presenting its federal claim. Although some confusion on this point was introduced by 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church a/Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 
314-15 (1987),24 the cases and commentary overwhelmingly support the rule established in the 
24 First English contains some remarkably broad language regarding takings claims: "We have recognized 
that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of 'the self-executing character of 
the constitutional provision with respect to compensation. '" First English, 482 at 315 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). However, this sweeping statement was offered as a background premise explaining the substantive issue in 
the case (temporary takings)-which the Court never reached-and not as a repudiation of the limitations on Bivens 
recognized by the Ninth Circuit and other courts. Indeed, First English does not address the question of whether 
takings claims may be brought directly under Constitution independent of § 1983. The opinion does not even mention 
§ 1983, and the dissent mentions it only in another context. Nor do the parties' briefs. Nor does the case on remand, 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 2lO Cal.App.3d 1353, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 893 (1989). This may be explained by the peculiar posture of the case. It was brought in state court pursuant to 
a complaint that alleged only violations of the state constitution. Somehow, in an apparent afterthought, the federal 
takings claim was introduced at the state appellate level. The U.S. Supreme Court said that was good enough to allow 
the case to be brought under 28 U.S.c. § 1257. First English, 482 U.S. at 313 n.8. Nor does the case cited by the 
Court for this proposition, United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) have anything to do with the Bivens 
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Ninth Circuit by Azul-Pacifico and other cases.25 There is also substantial secondary authority on 
this point.26 All of these authorities are post-First English. 
exception issue; Clarke involved a federal actor. Owing to the peculiar posture of the case, it appears that no one 
thought to ask whether a statutory cause of action was available. In any event, the Court did not address the question. 
Given that § 1983 was not discussed, it is fair to say that First English is not on point. Nevertheless, a few 
courts have assumed that First English offers a way for inverse condemnation cases to proceed around § 1983. E.g., 
Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); 287 Corporate 
Center Associates v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 1996). These cases, however, dispose of the 
claims on other grounds (statute of limitations) and do not engage on the issue of independent causes of action against 
state actors under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The only case we have encountered that expressly addresses 
and rejects Azul-Pacifico, albeit in dictum, is Lawyer v. Hilton Head Public Service Dist. No.1, 220 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 
2000): "Other courts, however, have held, in apparent conflict with First English, that a violation of the Takings 
Clause can only be redressed through a claim under § 1983." Lawyer at 303 nA. 
25 "Since Bivens, the Court has applied a two-prong test to determine whether an implied cause of action is 
necessary. According to this test, a Bivens action is permissible unless either (1) special factors counsel hesitation or 
(2) Congress has provided an alternative remedy intended to be an equally effective substitute for the Bivens claim." 
David C. Nutter, Two Approaches To Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution Is 
Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 Georgia L. Rev. 683, 683-84 (1985). 
Cases from other jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion as Azul-Pacifico include the following: Smith v. 
Dep 't of Public Health, 410 N.W.2d 749, 787 (Mich. 1987) ("Thus, both Chappell and Bush signal a retrenchment 
from the broad remedial scope evident in the Court's earlier Bivens, Davis, and Carlson opinions. Both Chappell and 
Bush suggest greater caution and increased willingness on the part of the Court to defer to Congress on the question 
whether to create damages remedies for violations of the federal constitution."); Kelley Property Development, Inc. v. 
Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 921 (Conn. 1993) ("In its current configuration, the Bivens line of United States 
Supreme Court cases thus appears to require a would be Bivens plaintiff to establish that he or she would lack any 
remedy for alleged constitutional injuries if a damages remedy were not created. It is no longer sufficient under 
federal law to allege that the available statutory or administrative mechanisms do not afford as complete a remedy as a 
Bivens action would provide."); Wax 'n Works v. City of St. Paul, 213 F.3d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000) (Plaintiff 
asserted claim directly under Fourteenth Amendment; court treated it as under § 1983 and denied relief on 
exhaustion/ripeness grounds); Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds & 
remanded, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989) (when § 1983 action is precluded by statute oflimitations, plaintiff may not bring 
separate action directly under the Constitution). 
Indeed, Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989), it would seem, should put to rest 
the suggestion that First English provides a basis for an end run around § 1983. It held: "We hold that the express 
'action at law' provided by § 1983 for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws,' provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by 
§ 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor." Jett, 491 U.S. at 735. 
26 "Although § 1983 provides express authorization for the assertion of federal constitutional claims against 
state actors, the Supreme Court has endorsed the view, expressed in several circuit court decisions, that limitations 
which exist under § 1983 may not be avoided by assertions of Bivens-type claims against state and local defendants. 
[Footnote citing Jet! v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701,735 (1989).] Thus, the availability of the § 
1983 remedy precludes reliance upon the Bivens doctrine. ... Whether § 1983 preempts an alternative constitutional 
or statutory claim depends upon congressional intent. ... As discussed below, it is settled that § 1983 operates to 
preempt alternative Bivens-type claims asserted directly under the federal Constitution. .,. The federal courts have 
consistently adhered to the principle that § 1983 preempts Bivens-type remedies against those who acted under color 
of state law. [Footnote citing Azul-Pacifico among others.]" Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims and 
Defenses, § 1.05 (20lO) (available on Westlaw as SNETLCD s 1.05). 
Another hornbook on § 1983 notes a variety of federal cases reaching the same conclusion, concluding, "The 
Ninth Circuit asserted that Fourteenth Amendment actions for damages against state defendants are precluded by the 
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Alpine initially pled its case solely as a federal claim arising directly under the 
Constitution. Verified Complaint ~ 26, R. Vol. I, p. 5. This was defective for the reasons noted 
above. Alpine later sought to cover its bet by adding an identical federal claim under § 1983. 
Second Amended Complaint ~ 35, R. Vol. II, p. 204. However, Alpine seeks to have its cake and 
eat it too by retaining the Bivens claim in the hope of evading the two-year statute of limitations 
that plainly applies to § 1983 actions. This does not work for two reasons: (1) Azul-Pacifico is 
sound precedent supporting the dismissal of Alpine's Bivens claim, and (2) even if a Bivens claim 
is allowed, it is subject to the same two-year statute of limitations. So it makes no difference. 
Alpine loses either way. 
Alpine rests its Bivens argument on dictum in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise 
("BHA 11'), 141 Idaho 168, 176 n.2, 108 P.3d 315, 323 n.2 (2004), in which the Court noted in 
passing that the plaintiffs brought their action directly under the federal Constitution and that 
doing so was permissible under First English (which it called First Lutheran). The District Court 
concluded that this statement was offered in a different context not controlling here and cannot 
overcome the powerful precedent in Azul-Pacifico and its progeny. Memorandum Decision at 12, 
R. Vol. III, p. 530. The City agrees, for the reasons discussed above. 
But Alpine's argument gets it nowhere. Even if a Bivens action were permissible here, it 
availability of § 1983." Sheldon Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983, 
§ 6:59 (2010) (available on Westlaw at CIVLIBLIT § 6:59). Another law professor concludes: 
Under Bivens, the courts are to refrain from a Bivens-type action for 
damages only when Congress has created an alternative remedy. Originally, the 
Court withheld a Bivens damages remedy, because unnecessary, only when the 
remedy provided by Congress was equally effective. Since Bivens, however, the 
Court has retreated from that principle and now refuses a damages action 
whenever Congress has made available some relief even if not equal to the 
damages remedy. 
Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism and the Courts, 59 
Missouri L. Rev. 499, 551 (1994) (footnote cites David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an 
Implied Cause of Action under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 Ga. L. 
Rev. 683 (1985». 
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would be subject to the same two-year statute oflimitations-thus rendering pointless Alpine's 
insistence that it has a separate cause of action directly under the Constitution. Alpine 
misleadingly infonns the Court that it is an open question whether Bivens actions are also subject 
to the two-year statute of limitations. "Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor this Court have ruled 
on the issue of whether the same statute oflimitations would apply to Alpine's First Cause of 
Action .... " Appellant's Brie/at 38. While that may be technically true, it is a half-truth. Alpine 
fails to infonn the Court that virtually if not every court in the nation that has addressed the 
question, including the Ninth Circuit, has held that Bivens actions are subject to the very same 
statute oflimitations (the one for personal injury) as are § 1983 claims.27 Although this Court has 
not had occasion to address the question, the clear federal precedents are definitive because the 
question is controlled by federallaw. 28 
(2) The federal statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of 
action becomes apparent. 
As noted immediately above, while state law supplies the statute oflimitations for a § 1983 
case, federal law detennines when that state statute begins to run. Under federal law, the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the constitutional wrong becomes apparent (closely tracking Idaho 
law). "A federal claim is generally considered to accrue when the plaintiff 'knows or has reason 
to know ofthe injury which is the basis ofthe action. '" Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 
801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Trotter v. Int'! Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's 
27 Bieneman v. City o/Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989) (direct 
takings claim subject to two-year statute); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Bieneman in 
Ninth Circuit in non-takings case); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21 (2nd Cir. 1987) (action brought directly under 14th 
Amendment); S. W Daniel, Inc. v. Urrea, 715 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("The court therefore concludes, 
as has virtually every appellate court addressing the issue, that the teachings of Wilson should be applied to Bivens 
actions as well.") (footnote citations omitted); McSurely v. Hutchinson, 823 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 934 (1988). 
28 Federa11aw dictates which statute oflimitations is applicable to federal claims and when that statute will 
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Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983)). See also, Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th 
Cir. 1996); Lukovsky v. City and County o/San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). 
Alpine filed its Verified Complaint on December 10,2010. Consequently, if the cause of 
action accrued earlier than December 10, 2008, Alpine has not satisfied the two-year statute of 
limitations. Even Alpine admits that, if the statute is running, it began to run on December 13, 
2007 (or March 22, 2007 at the earliest). Appellant's Brie/at 31. Thus, the only question is 
whether the statute has begun to run at all. 
Alpine contends that its federal cause of action has not accrued under Williamson County 
until its state claim is denied "on the merits." Appellant's Brie/at 37. Alpine then contends that 
because the District Court did not reach the merits, its federal cause of action has not yet accrued 
and the statute is not running against it. Id. First, there is no requirement in Williamson County 
that the denial be on the merits, as opposed to a procedural denial. More importantly, however, 
the Supreme Court made clear in 2005 that the cause of action has been running all along in state 
court. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County o/San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
Under Williamson County, Alpine's federal claim is not ripe in federal court. Williamson 
County requires that a plaintiff ripen the federal taking claim by first bringing an inverse 
condemnation action under state law. For some time after Williamson County, it was thought that 
this required a two-step process by which the plaintiff first litigates the state claim in state court, 
loses, and then litigates the federal claim in either state or federal court. This separation of claims 
created res judicata complications for the plaintiff. 
In 2005, however, the Supreme Court resolved this conundrum in San Remo by declaring 
that a plaintiff may bring the federal claim simultaneously (as an alternative claim) with the state 
claim in state court, and that doing so poses no problem under Williamson County's second prong 
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ripeness test. 
Prior to San Remo-when sequential litigation was presumed necessary-courts struggled 
with whether the statute oflimitations ran at all against the federal claim prior to its being ripened 
through litigation of the state claim. The Ninth Circuit held that the statute does not begin to run 
on the unripe federal claims.29 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the statute begins to run 
as soon as the wrong occurs. Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463,470 (7th Cir. 1988). 
But none of this matters after San Remo. San Remo clarifies that the federal claim is ripe from the 
outset in state court. Indeed, the federal claim, though not yet ripe in federal court, is ripe in state 
court and must be brought in state court simultaneously with the state claim in order to avoid res 
judicata. 
Here is the key point: If the claim is ripe in state court, it necessarily follows that the cause 
of action has accrued. Accordingly, the statute of limitations must be running and has been 
running all along. Since both the state and federal takings claims are ripe in state court, the statute 
of limitations began to run against them at the same time. (Different statutes of limitation may 
apply, but the start date is the same.) After all, they both arose out of the same facts. 
Alpine insists that this is not so. It contends that "Alpine's federal takings claims have not 
even accrued for statute of limitations purposes until a final decision denying Alpine 
compensation on Alpine's state constitutional cause of action has been rendered by the courts of 
Idaho." Appellant's Brief at 39 (emphasis original). For this point, it cites Levald, Inc. v. City of 
Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680,687 (9th Cir. 1993). 
29 "We further held in Levald that the date of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is denied in state 
courts, or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to state courts is futile. ... Thus, ... Hacienda's claim ... will 
either fail because it is not ripe, or, if it is ripe, it will be barred by the statute oflimitations." Hacienda Valley Mobile 
Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1041 (2004) (citing Levald, 
Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cir. 1993». See also, Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 
801 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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Alpine misses the fact that Levald (like Hacienda) dealt with federal takings claims 
brought in federal court that had not been previously ripened and were therefore not ripe in federal 
court.30 But these pre-San Remo decisions have no applicability to a plaintiff who, in compliance 
with San Remo, brings its claims together in state court. If the federal claim can be brought in 
state court, then obviously the cause of action has accrued, the statute of limitations is running, 
and the case must be brought in a timely fashion. San Remo was intended to avoid piecemeal 
litigation, not to give plaintiffs a free pass on the statute oflimitations. 
It may seem a little odd, by the way, that a cause of action is unripe in federal court, yet the 
very same cause of action is ripe in state court. Peculiar as this may seem, this was the precise 
holding of San Remo. Nevertheless, the District Court declined to follow the City's reasoning, 
saying that it was bound by pre-San Remo precedent. "However, the Court has found no 
controlling legal authority for the City's argument that the principles in Levald and Hacienda are 
inapplicable and is constrained by those cases to hold that I.C. § 5-219(4) does not begin to run 
until Alpine seeks state remedies and is denied compensation unless doing so would be futile." 
Memorandum Decision at 14, R. Vol. III, p. 532. The City hopes that this Court will not feel 
equally constrained by these pre-San Remo cases. Neither San Remo nor any other post-San Remo 
appellate court, so far as we know, has been called on to deal with the question of when the statute 
of limitations runs against a federal claim in state court. It would seem that the Court is free to 
apply San Remo in the way suggested by the City. 
(3) In the alternative, the statute of limitations began running when 
30 Nor does the case of Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986) help Alpine. 
Norco involved a state action that was brought in state court and removed. The Ninth Circuit held that the cause of 
action does not accrue until the case has been ripened under prong one of Williamson County. As noted, prong one 
ripeness is not an issue here because this is a facial challenge to Ordinance 819. Under San Remo, a case that is ripe 
under prong one (like the instant case) can be brought simultaneously in state court with the state claims. If it can be 
brought, then obviously the cause of action has accrued and statute of limitations is running. Neither Norco nor any 
other post-San Remo case is to the contrary. 
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Alpine missed its ITCA deadline. 
The District Court adopted an approach slightly different from the one urged by the City. 
While unwilling to find that the statute of limitations on the federal claim was running all along, it 
ruled that it began to run the day after Alpine blew its I80-day deadline under the ITCA (June 11, 
2008). The operation ofthe ITCA "functioned as the state's denial of compensation or made 
Alpine's future efforts to obtain compensation under state remedies futile." Memorandum 
Decision at 14, R. Vol. III, p. 532. Accordingly, Alpine had two years-until June 11, 2010-to 
file suit. Alpine missed that deadline by six months. 
If the Court rejects the City's argument under San Remo that the statute has been running 
against both state and federal claims all along, then this is a valid alternative basis for finding that 
Alpine missed the two-year statute of limitations. 
(4) Alpine's federal claim is late even under a four-year statute of 
limitations. 
For the same reasons that Alpine's state takings claim comes too late under the four-year 
statute oflimitations, Alpine's federal claim would violate that statute, too. Applying the two-year 
statute simply makes it that much more obvious that the claim is late. 
VIII. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES DICTATE DISMISSAL OF ALPINE'S LAWSUIT. 
Putting all of the above aside and looking at the case purely from the standpoint of equity, 
Alpine's state and federal claims should be denied. Alpine, of course, will contend that equity 
favors the developers because the City's affordable housing ordinances were declared invalid. But 
those ordinances did not control or compel Alpine's decision to purchase the Timbers. In 
addition, the record shows that the City was acting in good faith to address a serious problem. The 
City retained consultants with expertise in affordable housing ordinances (see housing report, 
Addendum 1 to Appellant's Briej), relied on their advice (which failed to take into account Idaho's 
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unique Constitution), and acted in an honest belief that it was within the law. See recitals in 
Ordinance 819 describing housing needs (R. Vol. II, pp. 208-09). Thus, the City has clean hands 
and is entitled to invoke the equitable defenses discussed below. 
First, Alpine received the benefit of its bargain under the development agreements. Its 
action in filing this lawsuit is inconsistent with those agreements and other representations it made 
in connection with them (notably its request for a release following Mountain Central). This 
implicates the equitable principles of unjust enrichment,3l quasi-estoppel/2 promissory estoppel,33 
and waiver. 34 
The City could have simply suspended processing of Alpine's applications when the 
Mountain Central case was filed, just as it imposed a moratorium on new applications. Instead, in 
an effort to accommodate the urgent desire of developers that their projects not be held up, the 
City reasonably relied on the release language in the Alpine Development Agreement, approved 
Alpine's project, and allowed Alpine to make good on its investment. Equity does not pennit 
Alpine to profit from the City's agreement, only to declare that it can sue the City outside the 
31 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 8 (2001). 
32 Quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents a person from denying an act or assertion if such 
denial is deemed to bring harm to another who reasonably relied on the act or assertion. See discussion in section 
ILC(2) beginning on page 17. 
33 Courts in equity can use "promissory estoppel" to enforce a promise made without consideration when the 
following elements are present: (i) the detriment suffered in reliance on the promise was substantial in an economic 
sense; (ii) the substantial loss to the promisee acting in reliance was, or should have been, foreseen by the promisor; 
and (iii) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise made. Rule Sales and Service, 
Inc. v. u.s. Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 674, 991 P.2d 857, 862 (Ct. App. 2000). Put another way, "the 
doctrine requires only that it be foreseeable to the promisor that the promisee would take some action or forbearance 
in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer substantial loss if the promise were to be dishonored." !d. at 
675,991 P.2d at 863. 
34 The equitable concept of "waiver" applies in an action for breach of contract and states that "a party who 
accepts the other's performance without objection is assumed to have received the performance contemplated by the 
agreement." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 640 (2001). "A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment ofa 
known right or advantage [and the] party asserting the waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon such a 
waiver and reasonably altered his position to his detriment." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,26,936 P.2d 219, 224 
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agreement. See Barry v. Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004) 
(general contractor was unjustly enriched by uncompensated work of subcontractor). Alpine's 
eleventh hour contention that the relief it secured under the development agreements is not good 
enough and that taxpayers should make it whole for the market slide that occurred after its 
purchase of the Timbers reaches too far. 
Second, the equitable principle of laches provides that a plaintiff is estopped from asserting 
the alleged invasion of his rights when: (i) the plaintiff delayed in asserting these rights; (ii) the 
plaintiffhad notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (iii) the defendant did not know that the 
plaintiff would assert such rights; and (iv) the delayed suit would injure or prejudice the 
defendant. Finucane v. Village of Hayden, 86 Idaho 199,205,384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963). All 
those tests are met here. Thus, if owing to some technicality, Alpine is excused from its failure to 
exhaust its administrative and judicial remedies and its failure to meet the I80-day, two-year, and 
four-year deadlines, equity should step in and bar relief. 
Had Alpine provided a timely notice that it believed merely purchasing the Timbers 
constituted a taking, the City could have protected itself. Allowing Alpine to recover its market 
losses associated with its decision to purchase the Timbers despite the pendency of Mountain 
Central would impose an unfair burden on the City's taxpayers. On no occasion did Alpine raise 
any objection to either development agreement. When the City approved the development subject 
to the housing requirements, Alpine remained silent. Even after Mountain Central was decided, 
Alpine asked only for a release from the housing restrictions. Having waited years, while the 
market declined, to discover its legal theory, Alpine should not be allowed to pin its losses on the 
City. 
(Ct. App. 1997). Here, Alpine is not claiming breach of contract against the City, but the principles behind the 
concept of waiver instruct that Alpine cannot now complain that the development agreements are unlawful. 
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IX. ALPINE'S CASE FAILS ON THE MERITS. 
A. Alpine has not pled a temporary taking, and, in any event, no 
cognizable temporary taking has occurred. 
Alpine contends, without citation, that the City has conceded that "if Alpine's claims were 
found to be timely, a compensable taking had in fact occurred." Appellant's Brie/at 9. The City 
has made no such admission. Of course, the City concedes that its ordinances were declared 
unconstitutional. But that does not mean that Alpine has a viable cause of action. After all, 
Alpine still owns the Timbers, and the City acted promptly and without prodding to release Alpine 
from any requirements imposed in the development agreements. 
Alpine now scrambles to characterize its claims as a temporary taking. But it failed to 
plead a temporary taking. Rather, it complained that it was forced to buy the Timbers, which 
turned out to be a poor investment. Second Amended Complaint ~~ 25,30, R. Vol. II, pp. 203-04. 
Nowhere does the Second Amended Complaint allege that Alpine missed an opportunity for a sale 
or otherwise suffered damages during the seven-plus months that the restrictive conditions were in 
place (from December 13, 2007, the date the Alpine Development Agreement was executed, to 
July 24, 2008, the first amendment to that agreement). Indeed, the Timbers Development 
Agreement was executed and amended (to eliminate the housing requirement) on the same day, so 
there is no possibility of any "temporary taking" under that contract. 
Even if the temporary taking claim is allowed, it fails on the merits. Although this Court 
on one occasion has recognized the concept of temporary takings, McCuskey v. Canyon County 
Comm'rs ("McCuskey Ir), 128 Idaho 213, 216, 912 P.2d 100,103 (1996), that case did not 
explore the contours of the law. Instead, the claim was rejected on the basis of the statute of 
limitations. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized some instances in which temporary 
takings can occur, e.g., First English, but those circumstances are limited. As the Court made 
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clear in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302 (2002), not every temporary regulation gives rise to a compensable taking. The U.S. Supreme 
Court applied the "parcel as a whole" rule to find that a moratorium on all construction was not a 
temporary taking. Thus, temporary takings appear to be limited to situations in which there is a 
total deprivation of all use of the property that was intended to be permanent, but the regulation is 
rescinded or overturned. See, Daniel L. Siegel and Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled 
Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 479 (2010). Here, in contrast, the City 
imposed restrictions on sales, but did not deprive the property owner of all value. 
The narrow applicability of temporary takings was reinforced by this Court held in 2004: 
As noted above, the destruction of access and deprivation of the use 
of property may be compensable, but the mere interruption of the 
use of one's property, as it is less than a permanent (complete) 
deprivation, does not mandate compensation. This Idaho authority 
relied upon by the district court has since been overruled by the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of a taking. 
Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 542, 96 P.3d 637,643 (2004). Likewise, in 
the case at bar, Alpine did not sell any units at below market rates (see footnote 19 at page 28), 
and it has made no allegation that it could have sold them at a higher price but for the restrictions. 
Accordingly, a temporary taking, even if it had been pled, has not been shown. 
But none of this matters. Temporary takings are subject to the same notice requirements, 
statutes oflimitations, and other defenses applicable to any other taking claim. Thus, even if 
Alpine were allowed to expand this lawsuit to include a temporary taking, the claim is barred for 
all the same reasons discussed above. 
B. The restrictions on sales to qualified buyers do not constitute a Loretto-
type per se physical taking. 
In apparent recognition that it cannot make out a regulatory taking under Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
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U.S. 374, 384 (1994),35 Alpine contends that Ordinance 819 took a stick in Alpine's bundle of 
property rights (the unrestricted right of sale) and therefore constitutes per se physical taking 
under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Appellant's Brie/at 
10-14. This argument collapses under scrutiny. 
Loretto involved a tangible physical invasion of property when the owners were required 
to allow third parties to install cable systems. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) 
was another classic physical invasion, involving a requirement that the landowner physically open 
a marina to the public. These cases bear no resemblance to the regulatory taking effected by 
Ordinance 819.36 
Alpine also cites Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), which involved the complete 
abrogation of rights of tribal members to bequeath certain real property, the result of which is that 
another entity (the tribe) became the owner of the property. Why Alpine even mentions Hodel is 
unclear. Perhaps Hodel may be characterized as a physical taking case (though the Court did not 
do so and this would be a stretch). But it certainly was not a per se taking. To the contrary, the 
35 Nollan and Dolan established the dual principles that an exaction is an unconstitutional taking only if (1) 
there is no "nexus" between the exaction and a public need created by the development and (2) the exaction is not 
roughly proportional to impact of the proposed development. 
36 "The government effects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical 
occupation of his land." Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 u.s. 519, 526 (1992) (emphasis supplied) (holding that a 
mobile home rent control statute did not affect a physical taking). No one requires a developer to apply for a permit. 
An exaction associated with a permit may be unlawful but, if it is, that is known as a regulatory taking. In Lingle v. 
Chevron USA, Inc., 544 u.s. 528 (2005), the Court, again, drew a clear distinction between physical takings and 
exaction-based regulatory takings, even when the end result is that the government ends up with physical possession 
of the plaintiff's money or property: "In each case, the Court began with the premise that, had the government simply 
appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se physical taking. The question was whether the 
government could, without paying the compensation that would otherwise be required upon effecting such a taking, 
demand the easement as a condition for granting a development permit the government was entitled to deny. . .. 
Nollan and Dolan both involved dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be 
deemed per se physical takings." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-47 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 
U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)). The distinction between physical 
and regulatory takings has been recognized by this Court as discussed in Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 
777, 781, 53 P.3d 828, 832 (2002) (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)). 
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Court analyzed it under the traditional balancing test, finding that some restriction on alienation 
would be fine, but in this case the regulatory scheme "goes too far." Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718. 
Thus, the case stands for the exact opposite of what Alpine represented to the Court 
Alpine also misleadingly relies on 0 'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 
(1949). This 63-year-old case stands for the well-established proposition that when a city 
downzones property it must allow prior nonconforming uses to continue and cannot take away the 
owner's right to sell the property to someone else who will maintain the pre-existing use. This 
does not equate to turning every regulatory restriction on property conveyances into per se 
takings. Indeed, the O'Conner Court explained that Moscow's bar on conveyances to persons 
wishing to maintain the very same use was "an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police 
power." O'Conner, 69 Idaho at 43,202 P.2d at 404. Thus, the Court did not find aper se taking. 
Rather, the case involved a determination that this particular action "is not a reasonable exercise of 
the police power and does not bear any reasonable, real or direct relationship, to the objects and 
purposes sought to be accomplished." O'Conner, 69 Idaho at 44,202 P.2d at 405. 
X. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY FEES 
The legal basis for the District Court's dismissal of Alpine's case was clear and based on 
settled law. Alpine has offered nothing on this appeal but a re-hash of its failed arguments below 
including misrepresentation of legal authority. Accordingly, the City seeks an award of its 
attorney fees incurred in this appeal in accordance with LA.R 35(b)(5) and 41. 
This case satisfies the threshold requirements in Idaho Code § 12-117.37 This is a civil 
action involving a governmental entity and private entities as adverse parties, and the City 
prevailed. All that remains is to establish that Alpine pursued the matter "without a reasonable 
37 This Court has ruled that if section 12-117 is available, it is exclusive. E.g., Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont 
County, 152 Idaho 207, 213, 268 P.3d 1159,1165 (2012). 
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basis in fact or law." Where parties ignore settled precedent, as Alpine did here, they are subject 
to a mandatory award of fees under 12-117. This Court has ruled that failure to address 
controlling appellate decisions and failure to address factual or legal findings of the district court 
equates to pursuing litigation without a reasonable basis in fact or law. E.g., Gallagher v. State, 
141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005) (attorney fees may be awarded when "the law is 
well-settled"). This is particularly egregious here in light of the City'S efforts to explain these 
authorities to Alpine early in the process. See letter from City to Alpine (R. Vol. II, p. 338). 
Alpine's claims are barred in numerous ways: exclusivity of judicial review, federal and 
state statutes oflimitations, ITCA's notice of claim requirement, exhaustion, voluntariness, 
exclusivity of § 1983, Williamson County, and equitable considerations. They also fail on the 
merits. Some defenses are stronger than others, but if one did not take the case down, another 
would. It was unreasonable for Alpine to press this litigation in the face of so many adverse 
precedents. As a result, the standards for an award of attorney fees to the City are met here.38 
XI. ALPINE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted LA.R. 35(a)(6) as requiring the appellant to 
present argument and authority on its attorney fee request in the opening brief. E.g., Cowles 
Publ'g Co. v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 144 Idaho 259, 266, 159 P.3d 896,903 
(2007). Alpine cites only two authorities: Ada County Highway Dist. by and through Fairbanks 
v. Accarequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Neither works. 
Accarequi deals only with attorney fees in eminent domain proceedings (that is, intentional 
physical takings affirmatively undertaken by the government pursuant to Idaho Const., art. I, 
38 The City is also entitled to an award of fees under 42 U.S.c. § 1988. The standard is functionally the same 
as 12-117. Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006). If the City prevails on § 1983, it 
should be allowed to present evidence regarding the lodestar amount and the factors set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
461 U.S. 424 (1983), pursuant to LA.R. 41(d). 
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§ 14). This is an inverse condemnation case based on a regulatory taking. The reasoning of 
Accarequi (and its 90 percent rule) is entirely inapposite. Moreover, Accarequi deals only with 
Idaho Code § 12-121 which is not available here (see footnote 37 at page 47). In any event, 
whatever the outcome of this appeal, the City's litigation position cannot be said to be 
unreasonable or frivolous given that it prevailed below. As for § 1988, the City has shown 
multiple reasons why the § 1983 claim was properly dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of this suit and 
award attorney fees to the City. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of June, 2012. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
By 
By 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of June, 2012, the foregoing was served as 
follows: 
Steven J. Millemann 
Gregory C. Pittenger 
MILLE MANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN & PEMBERTON 
P.O. Box 1066 
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ADDENDUM A: 
TIMETABLE OF KEy DOCUMENTS AND EVENTS 
Date Author or 
Actor 
7/1/2005 City 
2/23/2006 City Council 








10/12/2006 City Council 
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Document or Event Comments 





Housing Plan - Alpine 
Village Planned Unit 
Development 
Applications for 
Preliminary Plat, PUD 
Preliminary Plan 
Approval, CUP, Scenic 
Route Approval, and 
Amendment of Zoning 
Map ("Preliminary 
Applications") 
Complaint filed in Challenge to Ordinance 
Mountain Central v. City 819 and 820. 
of McCall 
Ordinance 827 Emergency moratorium 




of preliminary plat (SUB-
06-7). 
Ordinance 828 Provided an exception to 
the moratorium imposed 
under Ordinance 827 on 
9-28-2006. 
Sup. Ct. Record 
Addendum 1 to 
Appellant's Brief. 
R. Vol. I, p. 9; 
R. Vol. I, p. 103; 
R. Vol. II, p. 208; 
R. Ex. II (Ex. 1); 
R. Ex. 1 (Ex. C) (Ex. 1). 
As codified: 
R. Ex. II (Ex. 3). 
R. Ex. II (Ex. 2); 
R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 2). 
R. Ex. II (Ex. 4). 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~10, R. Vol. II, p. 201. 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~11, R. Vol. II, p. 201. 
Not in record. But this 
ordinance, as amended, 
appears as Ordinance 
828. 
R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 5); 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~12, R. Vol. II, p. 201. 
R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 6) 
Page A-I 
12/10/2006 DEADLINE 
12/13/2006 City Council 
1/5/2007 Alpine 
3/12/2007 Alpine 
3/22/2007 Alpine & 
City Council 





8/23/2007 City Council 




Cut-off date for four-year 







Purchase and Sale 









an Application for Final 
Plat Approval, SUB-06-




Closed on purchase of 
Timbers. 
Application for final plat 
& final PUD plan 
approval for Phase 1 . 
Findings and 
Conclusions Regarding 
Applications for Final 
Plat and Final Plan 
Approval, SUB-06-7, 
PUD-06-3, Alpine 
Village, Final Plat and 
Plan 
Development Agreement 
- Alpine Village PUD 
Preliminary plat approval. R. Ex. II (Ex. 9); 
R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 5); 
R. Ex. I, (Ex. C) (Ex. 7); 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~13, R. Vol. II, p. 201. 
R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 7); 
R. Ex. I, (Ex. C) (Ex. 8); 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~14, R. Vol. II, p. 201-
02. 
R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 4); 
R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 4). 
This is an unexecuted, R. Ex. II (Ex. 13) 
undated draft. It appears 
to be identical to the 
version recorded on 7-7-
2009, except for the 
addition of a new Article 
VII. 
R. Ex. I, (Ex. C) (Ex. 9); 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~15, R. Vol. II, p. 202. 
R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 6); 
R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 11). 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~16, R. Vol. II, p. 202. 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
~18, R. Vol. II, p. 202. 
R. Ex. II (Ex. 15);R. Ex. I 
(Ex. B) (Ex. 8);R. Ex. I, 
(Ex. C) (Ex. 
12);Described in 
Second Amended 
Complaint ~1g, R. Vol. 
II, p. 202. 
Executed by all parties R. Vol. II, p. 225; 
on 12-13-07. Recorded Described in Second 
1-28-2008 as Instrument Amended Complaint 




3/25/2008 Alpine & 
City Council 
4/24/2008 City Council 





-_ ... _ .. 
DEADLINE 
6/26/2008 City Council 




Decision issued in 
Mountain Central v. City 
of McCall 
Development Agreement 
- Alpine Village PUD 
Ordinance 856 
Resolution 08-11 
Email to City requesting 
release of restrictions 
and submitting draft First 
Amendment to 
Development Agreement 
- Alpine Village Planned 
Unit Dev~I0..Ement. 





First Amendment to 
Development Agreement 
- Alpine Village PUD. 
Invalidated Ordinance R. Vol. II, p. 237; 
819 and 820. R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 10); 
R. Ex. I, (Ex. C) (Ex. 
14); 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
1[21, R. Vol. II, p. 203. 
This document appears R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 9); 
to be identical to the R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 13); 
earlier Development R. Ex. II (Ex. 16). 
Agreement except for 
Exhibit A (legal 
description). 
Signed by City on 3-25-
2008; signed by Alpine 
on 3-6-2008. Recorded 
on 4-7-2008 as 
Instrument #330524. 
Repealed Ordinance 819. R. Vol. II, p. 270; 
R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 11); 
Described in Second 
Amended Complaint 
1[22, R. Vol. II, p. 203. 
Providing refunds of R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 12); 
housing fees collected R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 15). 
under Ordinance 820. 
R. Vol. III , pp. 417. 
----nie-District Court said Discussed in 
that on this day Alpine's Memorandum Decision 
state claim was barred at 9,13-14, R. Vol. III, p. 
I under the (TCA (based 527,531-32. on cause of action I 
accruing on 12-13-2007). I 
The District Court also 
said this ripened the 
federal claim, triggering 
the two-year statute of 
limitations. 
Providing refunds of R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 16). 
community housing fees 
under Ordinances 820, 
828, and 833. 
Effective date 7-24-2008. R. Vol. II, p. 289; 
Signed by Alpine 6-6- R. Ex. I (Ex. 8) (Ex. 13); 
2008. Described in Second 
Signed by Mayor 7-24- Amended Complaint 
2008. 1[23, R. Vol. II, p. 203. 




12110/2008 DEADLINE Cut-off date for two-year 
. ~ ~~tute of limitations . 
5/21/2009 Alpine & 
City Council 
5/21/2009 Alpine & 
City Council 
11/4/2009 City Council 
1------_._ .. _-.-
6/11 /2010 













- The Timbers 
First Amendment to 
Development Agreement 
- The Timbers 
Resolution 09-10 
t-=- ... - - .- ... ---~-.---
Two years after 181 
days after execution of 
Development Agreement 
on 12-13-2007. 
Demand letter, sent by 
Steven J. Millemann, 
seeking payment of 
damages. 
Verified Complaint 
Letter to Steven A. 





Recorded 8-20-2008 as 
Instrument #334281. 
No effective date. R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 10). 
Signed by City 5-8-09. 
Signed by Alpine 5-21-
09. Recorded 7-7-09 as 
Instrument # 343026. 
This appears to be 
identical to the undated 
draft referenced above 
on 3-22-2007, except for 
the addition of a new 
Article VII. 
Effective date 4-9-2009. Addendum B to 
Signed by City 5-8-2009. Respondent's Brief on 
Signed by Alpine 5-21- appeal. 
2009. 
Recorded 7-7-2009 as 
Instrument # 343027. 
Effective 12-31-2009, R. Ex. I (Ex. C) (Ex. 17). 
eliminated refunds of 
commuity housing fees 
collected under 
Ordinances 820, 828 & 
833. Repealed 
Ordinance 08-17. - .... _-- --,:c- - - '- " 
The District Court said Discussed in 
that on this day (two Memorandum Decision l years after expiration of at 13-14, R. Vol. III. pp. ITCA deadline) Alpine 531-32. I could no longer bring 
i 
inverse condemnation I 
challenge and therefore I 
could not satisfy prong 2 ! 
of Williamson County. 
This is referenced in the Described in Second 
Verified Amended Amended Complaint 
Complaint at paragraphs 1J1J28 , 33, R. Vol. II, p. 
28 and 33. 204. 
Pled only federal takings R. Vol. I, p. 1 
claim. 
R. Vol. II, p. 338 
Identical except it adds a R. Vol. I, p. 95 
state takings claim. 
Identical except it adds R. Vol. II, p. 199 
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Memorandum Decision R. Vol. III, p. 519 
on Plaintiffs and 
Defendant's Cross 
Motions for Summary 
Judgment 
Judgment R. Vol. III, p. 535 
Notice of Appeal (to R. Vol. III, p. 538 
Idaho Supreme Court) 




FIRST AMENDMENT TO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT - THE TIMBERS 
Recording Requested By and 
When Recorded Return to: 
City Clerk 
City of McCall 
216 East Park Street 
McCall, Idaho 83638 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
(THE TIMBJmS CONDOMINUM) 
This First Amendmcnt to Development Agreement, hereinafter referred to as "Pirst 
Amendment", is entered illto effective the 9 day of April, 2009, by and between the City of 
McCall, a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, hereinafter refelTed to as the "City", and 
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, and Idaho corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Developcr", 
whose address is P.O. Box 6887, Boise, Idaho 83707, and who is the owner of THE TIMBERS 
CONDOMINIUM, as the same is platted of record with Valley County, Idaho. 
WHEREAS, the Chy and Developer entered into a Development Agreement recorded 
:1~2~.oI~~~~._~. as Instrument No. ?/:l3O;1.1:. filed of record with the Office of 
Recorder of Valley County, Idaho (the "Agreement"). 
WHEREAS. the Agreement pl'Ovided that Developer would constru<:t two fire hydrants; 
however the Developer was ollly required to construct one fire hydrant pursuant to thc 
recommendation of the McCall Fire Department. 
WHEREAS, the Agreement included a Community Housing Pian and contained 
provisions requiring Developer to provide Community Housing pursuant to McCall Cily 
Ordinance No. 819 (the "Ordinance"). 
WHEREAS, the Ordinance has been declared void by means of that certain 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, which 
was rendered by the District Court of the Fourth ,ludicial District of the State of Idaho in Valley 
County Case No. CV 2006·490·C. 
WHEREAS, the Ordinance has been repealed by the City. 
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that the Agreement should be amended to eliminate 
the Community HOllsing Plan and any requirements that Developer provide Community llousing 
Units. The 17 Units approved as Community Housing Units ean be sold as Market Rate Units. 
WHEREAS, the Agreement provided that the Developer would COnstruct Ii Parking 
Facility, Storage Facility by December 1,2007. 
first Amendment to Development Agreement for Ihe Timbers Condominium 
Page I 01'4 
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WHEREFORE, the City of McCall and the Developer do agree to amend and 
the Agreement, as follows: 
1. Amendments 
Article III 
Article III of the Agreement shall be modified to read as follows: 
3.1 Developer shall construct one additional fire hydrant pursuant to the 
specifications of the City of McCall ("Fire Hydrant"), prior to the sale of 
any Units. 
Article IV 
Article IV of the Agreement shall be deleted in its entirety and Developer shall be 
and hereby is released from any requirement to provided Community Housing for 
or related to the condominium. 
Article IV shall be modified to read: 
Section Not Used. 
Article V 
Article V ofthe Agreement shall be modified to read as follows: 
4. t On or before December 1,2009, Developer shall construct: (a) the covered 
parking structures, as depicted in the Timbers Condominium Parking Plan, 
which was approved by the City as part of the Applications; and (b) the 
Storage Facility. 
2. Continuing Effect of the Agreement. 
Except as expressly modified by the tertns of this First Amendment, the 
Agreement shall remain fully in force and binding on the parties according to its 
terms. 
3. Miscellaneous. 
After its execution, this First Amendment shall be recorded in the ofl'ice of the 
Valley COlmty Recorder, at the expense of Developer. Each commitment and 
covenant contained in this First Amendment shall constitute a btmlen on, shall be 
appurtenant to, and shall run with the PUD Property. This First Amendment shall 





be binding on the City and Developer and their respective heirs, administrators, 
executors, agents, legal representatives, successors and assigns. 
iN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto caused this Firsl Amendment to 
be executed, effective Oll the day and year first above written. 
ALPINE VU,LAGE COMPANY 
By:"f/t!~ 
Michael Honnacchea, President 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
(S5. 
County of Valley. ) 
CITY Of MCCALL 
BY.~~ 
dert Kulesza, Mayor 
ATTEST: 
On this...;>1 day of -rrla. ,2009, before me'~'t{S;~::::<;;/~' a 
Notary Public in and for said State, . rsonally appeared Michael lIonnaechea, known or 
identified 10 me to be the President of the corporation that executed the instrument or the person 
who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that such 
corporation executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I bave hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the 
day and year in this certificalc fil'si above written. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
fir.t Amendment to Development Agreement For the Timbers Condominium 




County of Valley. 
On this -L day of 'f-rzCU-J!, 2009, before me, J)e.~'7'4 S~~~~ 
a Notal')' Public in and for said State. p~lIy appeared Bert Kulesza and BcssieJo Wagner 
known or identified to me to be the Mayor and the City Clerk of tbe City of McCall, ID, 
respectively, the Idaho municipal corporation that executed the instrument or the person that 
executed the instrument on of behalf of said municipal corporation, and the perSOll who attested 
the Mayor's signature to the lnstnnnent, and acknowledged to me that such municipal 
corporation executed the same, 
TN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my band and affixed my official seal, the 
day and year in this celtif1cate first above written. 
(SEAL) 
My Commission Expires: ---'----,,.£-_ 
First Amendment 10 Development Agreemem for the Timbers Condominium 





LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IDAHO CODE § 67-6521(2)(B) 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Second Regular Session - 19% Fifty-third Legislature 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 628 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
2 RELATING TO PLANNING AND ZONING; AMENDING SECTION 67-6521, IDAHO CODE, TO PRO-
3 VIDE REMEDIES FOR AN AFFECTED PERSON WHO CLAIMS THAT A ZONING ACTION OR 
4 PERMITTING ACTION WAS IN ESSENCE AN EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION. 
5 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
6 SECTION 1. That Section 67-6521, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
7 amended to read as follows: 
8 67-6521. ACTIONS BY AFFECTED PERSONS. 
9 (1) (a) As used herein, an affected person shall mean one having an inter-
10 est in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or 
11 denial of a permit authorizing the development. 
12 (b) Any affected person may at any time prior to final action on a permit 
13 required or authorized under this chapter, if no hearing has been held on 
14 the application, petition the commission or governing board in writing to 
15 hold a hearing pursuant to section 67-6512, Idaho Code; provided, however, 
16 that if twenty (20) affected persons petition for a hearing, the hearing 
17 shall be held. 
18 (c) After a hearing, the commission or governing board may: 
19 (ii) Grant or deny a permit; or 
20 (~Ii) Delay such a decision for a definite period of time for further 
21 study or hearing. Each commission or governing board shall establish 
22 by rule and regulation a time period within which a recommendation or 
23 decision must be made. 
24 (d) An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight 
25 (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances 
26 seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
27 (2) (a) Authority to exercise the regulatory power of zoning in land use 
28 planning shall not simultaneously displace coexisting eminent domain 
29 authority granted under section 14, article I, of the constitution of the 
30 state of Idaho and chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code. 
31 (b) An affected person claiming "just compensation" for a perceived 
32 "taking," the basis of the claim being that a specific zoning action or 
33 permitting action restricting private property development is actually a 
34 regulatory action by local government deemed "necessary to complete the 
35 development of the material resources of the state," Or necessary for 
36 other public uses, may seek a judicial determination of whether the claim 
37 comes within defined provisions of section 14, article I, of the constitu-
38 tion of the state of Idaho relating to eminent domain. Under these cir-
39 cumstances, the affected person is exempt from the provisions of subsec-
40 tion (1) of this section and may seek judicial review through an inverse 
41 condemnation action specifying neglect by local government to provide 
42 "just compensation" under the provisions of section 14. article It of the 




STATEHE T OF PURPOSE 
RS OSS33c.l 
This proposed legislation amends local government land use 
planning statu es to the extent that admlnlst~ative remed as 
Deed not be exhausted prior to judicial review if II. taking claim 
involves court determination of public use under provisions 
of eminent domain . 
FISCAL NOTE 
No cost to local gover nment unl ess district court makes II. 
determination tlla.t public use under provisions of eminent domain 











HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS 
DATE: JANUARY 30,1996 
TIME: 9:00 A.M. 
PLACE: Room 412 
PRESENT: Chairman Crane, Vice Chairman Deal, Representatives Stone, Tippets. Wood, 
Sutton, King, Alltus, Dorr, Erhart, Hornbeck, Kjellander, Field, Gines, Vandenberg. 
Stoicheff, Alexander and Judd. 
ABSENT: Representatives Newcomb and loertscher were absent. 
MOTION: Chairman Crane called the meeting to order at 9:03 A.M. Representative King 
moved that the minutes of January 29. 1996 be approved. The motion was seconded 
by Representative Dorr. Motion Passed. 
RS05744 Representative Stoicheff presented RS05744. The purpose of this legislation is to 
allow people who do not live within a fire district but do own property within a fire district 
and who are Idaho residents to vote in all fire districts elections. 
MOTION: Representative Vandenberg made a motion that RS05744 be introduced for printing. 
Representative Stone seconded the motion. Motion passed. 
RS05248C1 Representative Alltus presented RS05248C1. The purpose of this legislation is to stop 
public funds from going to lobbying. 
MOTION: Representative Erhart made a motion that RS05248C1 be returned to sponsor. 
Representative Stone seconded the motion. 
SUBSTITUTE Representative Dorr made a SUbstitute motion that RS05248C1 be introduced for 
MOTION: printing. Representative Gines seconded the motion. The motion passed. Counting 
vote of 12 Ayes. 
RS05332C2 Mr. Freeman Duncan from the Attorney General's Office, presented RS05332C2. The 
purpose of this legislation is to address the statewide problems associated with the 
recording of vexatious common law liens against state and local officials. The legislation 
deals with non-statutory lien claims that are not court-imposed, are not consented to by 
the owner of the property being /iened, and are premised upon the alfeged performance 
or nonperformance of an officiars duties. The legislation provides for an expedited 
court procedure for challenge of the lien, and for the ability of the property owner to 
recover a civil penalty of $5,000.00 or actual damages, which ever is greater, if the claim 
is found by a court to be groundless or false. Mr. Bill Von Tagen, from the Attorney 
General's office, answered questions raised by the committee concerning RS05332C2. 
MOTION: Representative Hornbeck made a motion that RS05332C2 be introduced for printing. 
Representative Stone seconded the motion. The motion passed. 
RS05507 Representative Crow presented RS05507. The purpose of this legislation is to repeal 
the Idaho Code which allows dog racing. It would further amend the Idaho Code to 
eliminate dog racing from the definition of a race meet and to eliminate references to 
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training dogs tl.)ce by the use of live lures. 
MOTION: Representative Wood made a motion that RS05507 be introduced for printing. 
Representative Dorr seconded the motion. The motion passed. 
RS05533C1 Representative Kempton presented RS05533C1. This proposed legislation amends 
local government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies 
need not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court 
determination of public use under provisions of eminent domain. Representative 
Kempton brought to the attention of the committee that a typo error needed to be 
corrected on line 32. '" "taking." should read "aking", .... 
MOTION: Vice Chairman Deal made a motion that RS05533C1 be introduced for printing with 
the typo error corrected. Representative Gines seconded the motion The motion 
passed. legislative services indicated that the RS05533C1 was correct as typed. 
Representative Kempton will let Chairman Crane know that the RS was printed as first 
read. 
H 419 Mr. Dwight Johnson from the Department of Employment, presented H 419. 
This bill contains three amendments to Idaho'S Employment Security law. Currently. 
one criteria for determining wether an employer is covered by the Employment Security 
law is whether the employer paid three hundred dollars ($300) in covered wages in a 
calendar quarter. H 419 Increased the amount covered to fifteen hundred dollars 
($1500). The second amendment would allow the Governor to consolidate the 
Employment Service AdviSOry Council with Similarly focused advisory bodies to 
eliminate overlapping advisory bodies and their attendant costs. The third amendment 
allows individuals filing a new claim for unemployment insurance benefits to voluntarily 
elect to have federal income tax withheld from their benefits checks. 
MOTiON: Representative Erhart made a motion that H 419 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS. 
Representative Wood seconded the motion. The motion passed. Vice Chairman Deal 
will Sponsor the bill on the floor. 
Meeting adjourned at 10:08 A.M. Next meeting will be Wednesday, January 31, 1996 at 
9:30A.M. 
.~~ ttt~ Jt;;; \ ~06~ u1~ '--- - r Y 
RON G. CRANE, CHAIRMAN JUDITH CHRISTENSEN, SECRETARY 
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Minutes \_~. ' 
HOUSE STATE AFFAIRS 
DATE: February 13, 1996 
TIME: 8:30 A.M. 
PLACE: Room 412 
PRESENT: Chairman Crane, Vice Chairman Deal, Representatives Stone, Wood, Erhart, 
Sutton, King, Alltus, Dorr, Hornbeck, Kjel/ander, Field, Newcomb, 
Stoicheff, Judd, Tippets, Vandenberg, Alexander and Gines. 
ABSENT: Representative loertscher 
MOTION: Chairman Crane called the meeting to order at 8:40 AM. Representative King 
moved that the minutes of February '12, 1996 be approved. The motion was seconded 
by Representative Alltus. Motion Passed. 
RS05816 Representative Gines presented RS05876. This Joint House Memorial deems it to be a 
violation of the rights of those who serve in our nation's military and the rights of the 
American people who pay for our nation's military to transfer the United States armed 
forces to the United Nations or any other foreign command. 
MOTION: Representative King made a motion that RS05876 be introduced for printing. 
Representative Dorr seconded the motion. Motion passed. 
H 628 Representative Kempton presented H 628. This proposed legislation amends local 
government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies need 
not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court determination of 
public use under provisions of eminent domain. 
MOTION: Vice Chairman Deal made a motion that H 628 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS. 
Representative Stone seconded the motion. Motion passed. 
H 654 Mr. Michael Sheeley from the Department of Administration presented H 654. To 
amend existing central postal system statutes to allow statehouse mail delivery to all 
state office buildings located within the boundaries of Ada County. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
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Testimony in favor of H 654 was given by Mr. Jake Hofhman from the Department of 
Administration. 
Testimony opposed to H 654 was given by Mr. Ed Johnson from Auto Sort, Mr. David 
Eichmann, manager of BSU mail services and Ms. linda-Diane Hill from Pitney Bowes 
Company. 
H 654 was assigned to a sUb-committee chaired by Vice Chairman Deal. 








Mr. Michael sheefey presented H 657. This legislation a..:!.orized the Administration of 
the Division of Purchasing to acquire information technology property by means of the 
award of a contract to multiple bidders. 
Testimony in support of H 657 was given by Mr. Gary Silvester from the Department of 
Administration and Ms. Elinor Cheney, accountant for the Commission on Aging. 
Representative Alltus made a motion to send H 657 to the floor with a DO PASS. Vice 
Chairman Deal seconded the motion. Motion passed. Representative Stoicheff 
recorded as a nay vote. Representative King will carry the bill. 
Ms. Pam Ahrens, Director of the Department of Administration presented H 661. This 
legislation repeals the existing statute regarding the Advisory Council on Information 
Technology and creates the Information Technology Resource Management Council. 
Testimony supporting H 661 was given by Mr. Gene Watkins. 
Representative Kjeflander made a motion that H 661 be sent to the floor with a DO 
PASS. Representatives Field, Hornbeck, and Alexander seconded the motion. Motion 
passed. Representatives Kjellander and Alexander will carry the bill to the floor. 
Representative. Newcomb presented H 676. The purpose of this legislation is to require 
the state Historic preservation officer be appointed by the Governor. 
Testimony supporting H 676 was given by Mr. Weldon Branch representing ICA and 
Mr. Frank Land representing ICA 
Representative Sutton made a motion that H 676 be sent to the floor with a DO PASS. 
Representatives Wood, Stone, Hornbeck and Kjellander seconded the motion. Motion 
passed. Representative Newcomb will carry the bill to the floor. 
Meeting adjourned at 10:10 AM. Next meeting for the State Affairs Committee will be 
Wednesday, February 14, 1996, at 9:00 AM. 
RON G. CRANE, CHAIRMAN JUDITH CHRISTENSEN, SECRETARY 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
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FRIDAY, MARCH 1,1996 
DESCRIPTION 
Sales tax seiler's permits 
Income tax grocery credit, must be Idaho resident 
Provides remedy for a zoning action which was in 
essence an eminent domain action 
Transportation analysis, local jurisdiction 








Budget limit exemption for five years/capital improvement Cities 
projects 
Income tax shareholder/corporate credits for payment Phillip Barber 
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SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT & TAXATION COMMITTEE 
DATE: March 1,199& 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
PLACE: Room 426 




Chairman Thorne called the meeting to order at 3:07 p.m. Senator Furness moved approval of 
the minutes for February 23, 1996. Senator Parry seconded the motion. By unanimous voice vote 
the motion passed. Senator Tucker moved approval oJ the minutes for February 28, 1996. 
Senator Wheeler seconded the motion. By unanimous voice vOle the motion passed. Senator 
Frasure moved approval of the minutes for February 26, 1996. Senator Tucker seconded the 
motion. By unanimous voice vote the motion passed. A silent roll call was taken. 
H 765 Ted Spangler, Idaho State Tax Commission, presented House Bill 765. This legislation makes 
changes to the Idaho Sales Tax Act relating to seller's permits. Presently, seller's permits are 
indefinite. Many of these sellers are no longer in business. With this legislation, seller's permits 
will automatically expire after a period of twelve consecutive months of no sales .reported. Non-
profit organizations that have only one large sale per year can apply for a one time sale report. 
MOTION Senator Ipsen moved to send House Bill 765 to the floor wjth a "do pass· recommendation. 
Senator Frasure seconded the motion. 
VOTE By unanimous voice vote the motion passed. Senator· Ipsen will carry the bill. 
H 686 Representative Wood explained House Bill 686. This legislation is an effort to stop the practice 
of persons claiming a grocery credit on their taxes when filing for dependents not domiciled in this 
State. Enforcement would be up to tax preparers. 
MOTION Senator Ipsen moved that House Bill 686 be sent tQ the floQ( wjth a "do pass" recommendatiQIl. 
Senator Parry seconded the motion. 
SUBSTITUTE 








Bya roll call vote of 3-6 the substitute mQtion fai/ed, with Senators Hawkins, Frasure and Tucker 
voting aye; and Senators Thorne, Parry, Furness, Ipsen, Wheeler, and Stennett voting nay. 
Bya roll call vote of 6-3 the oriltinal IDQtiQn passed, with Senators Thorne, Parry, Furness, Ipsen, 
Wheeler, and Stennett voting aye; and Senators Hawkins, Frasure and Tucker voting nay. Senator 







Representative Kempton distributed a handout and explained House Bill 628. This legislation 
amends local government land use planning statutes to the extent that administrative remedies need 
not be exhausted prior to judicial review if a taking claim involves court determination of public 
use under provisions of eminent domain. 
Senator Stennett moved to hold House Bill 628 in committee. There was no second. 
Senator Frasure moved 10 send House Bill 628 to the full Senate with a "do pass" 
recommendation. Senator Wheeler seconded the motion. 
Senator Stennett felt this would create more crowding in the courts. Senator Hawkins felt this may 
increase local discussion and lighten the load on the courts. 
By a roll call vote of 8-1 the motion passed, with Senators Thorne, Hawkins, Parry, Furness, 
Frasure, Ipsen, Wheeler, and Tucker voting aye; and Senator Stennett voting nay. Senator 
Hawkins will sponsor the bill. 
UNANIMOUS CONSENT 
REQUEST Chairman Thorne requested unanimous consent to hold House Bill 809 until Monday, given that two 
of the committee members needed to be excused momentarily, and the sponsor desired to have all 











Scott McDonald, Association of Idaho Cities, explained House Bill 672. This legislation requires 
the cities and counties to prepare the comprehensive plans in coordination with whoever has 
jurisdiction over the local highway system. 
Senator Wheeler moved to send House Bill 672 to the floor with a "do pass" recommendation. 
Senator Frasure seconded the motion. 
By unanimous voice vote the motion ~. Senator Wheeler will carry the bill. 
Ken McClure, representing the Gity of Boise, -explained House Bill 741. Idaho Code currently 
requires government entities to negotiate fire fighter contracts through a quorum of the city council 
and mayor, or county commission, or fire district board. This legislation would allow the 
government entity to designate a person with authority to bargain on its behalf. 
Senator Furness moved to send House Bm 741 to the floor with a "do pass· recommendation. 
Senator Stennett secooded the motion. 
By unanimous voice vote the motion passed. Senator Furness will carry the bill. 
Scott McDonald presented House Bill 757 as amended to the committee. This legislation will 
extend from 2 years to 5 years for capital improvements as an exemption from the budget 
limitations of taxing districts. He suggested a new amendment to replace two and add the word 
"or" to make the new language read "two or five years" 
Senator Hawkins moved 10 hold House Bill 7573 in committee. Senator Furness seconded the 
motion. 
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE 








Senator Wheeler made a substitute motion 10 send House BjII 7573 to the 14th order for 
amendment. Senator Stennett seconded the motion. 
By majority voice vote the substitute motion failed. 
By majority voice vote the original motion passed. House Bill 757 as amended will be held in 
committee. 
Meeting adjourned at 4:28 p.m. 
SENATE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITIEE 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE 
3/1/t,b 
the manner prescribed by law. 
GUARANTIES IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAIi . In all criminal pro secutions, the 
right to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel 
nee of witnesses in his behalf, and to appear and defend in person and with counsel. 
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor be compelled in any criminal case to be 
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
'RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN. The necessary use of lands for the construction of reservoirs or 
basins, for t he purpose of irrigation, or for rights of way for the construction of canals, ditches, 
or pipes, to convey water to the place of use for any useful , beneficial or necessary purpose, or for 
or for the drainage of mines, or the working thereof. by means of roads, railroads, tramways. cuts. 
shafts, hoisting works, dumps, other necessary means to their complete development. or any other 
to the the material resources of the state the preservation of the 
to regulation and control of 
be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the 
shall be paid therefor. 
IMPRISOMMENT FOR DEBT PROHIBITED. There shall be no imprisonment for debt in this state 
of fraud. 
BILLS OF ATTAINDER, ETC .• PROHIBITED. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impair-
obligation of contracts shall ever be passed. 
17. UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PROHIBITED. The right of the people to be secure in their 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violatedj and no 
issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be 
person or thing to be seized. 
JUSTICE TO BE FREELY AND SPEEDILY ADMINISTERED. Courts of justice shall be open to every 
and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character, and right and justice 
administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice. 
RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE GUARANTIED . No power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere with 
exercise of the right of suffrage. 
NO PROPERTY QUALIFICATION REQUIRED OF ELECTORS -- EXCEPTIONS . No property qualifications 
required for any person to vote or hold office except in school elections, or elections creating 
~t,edlne,ss. or in irrigation district elections, as to which last-named eleetions the legislature may 
voters to land owners. 
RESERVED RIGHTS NOT IMPAIRED. This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
other rights retained by the people . 
ARTICLE II 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
SECTION I . DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. The powers of the government of this state are divided into three 
tinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged 
1 the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly 
)nging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
ARTICLE III 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER -- ENACTING CLAUSE -- REFERENDUM -- INITIATIVE. The l egislative power of the 
te shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives. The enacting clause of every bili shall be as 
lows: "Be i t enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho." 
The people reserve to themselves the power to approve or reject at the polls any act ' or measure passed by 
legislature . This power is known as the referendum, and legal voters may, under such conditions and in 
h manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature, demand a referendum vote on any act or measure 
sed by the legislature and cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people for their approval or 
eetion . 











I '· " . 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 






_ 36. BOX 28 
.,ON. IDAHO 83311 
1208) 673-6261 
REVENUE & TAXATION 
TRANSPORTATION & DEFENSE 
JUDICIARY. RULES & ADMINISTRATION 
TO: 
House of Representatives 
State of Idaho 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
January 15, 1996 
SUBJECT: ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION; Eminent Domain Relevance 
in Land Use planning. 
Eminent domain provisions of Article 1, Section 14, of the Idaho 
Const itution are r a ther un i q ue in that eminent domain relevance 
i n ques t ions o f "ta kings" is es tablished, in part, on the basis 
of actions by state or local government that are deemed 
"neces s ary to the complete development of the material resources 
of the state". 
Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Engine Mill Co . , a 1916 case before 
the Idaho Supreme Court, defines in considerable detail the 
court's authority to determine uses "necessary to the complete 
development of the material resources of the state"; thereby 
suggesting that j. n today' s land 11se regllJ a tory envj ronment 
eminent domain rel~ce should remain a statutory consideration 
in an " affectQG pen;OR '6" ri gl:lt to access jl1l:licial rQ'rie"/ 
If so, an "affected person 1 s" a ccess t o th e cOllrts need no!; 
always involve exhaustion of administrative remedies under 
67-6521 Cd), Idaho Co de. 
An Attorney General ' s opinion is therefore requested 
to the attached "RS"i specifically, in the 
presented, is the or oposed language 
"affected person"s" right to access 'udicial 
a co[respon lng nee to exhaust adminis t rative 
Thank you in advance for your assistance 




ALAN G. LANCE 
ATIORNEY GeNERAL 
Honorable Jim D. Kempton 
Idaho House of Representatives 
Statehouse 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Dear Representative Kempton: 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Statehou:!le, Room 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
BOISE 83720·0010 
January 24, 1996 
Telepnone (200) ;)34·2400 
Fall: (208) 334·2530 
Crimlnal18w OIvlSKm 
F8,K: (200) 334·2942 
Natural Resoun;:as Division 
Fax: (208l334·2G90 
Per our discussion, I have reviewed your proposed legislation allowing certain 
individuals aggrieved by a planning and zoning decision of a governmental body to 
proceed directly to court, rather than exhaust administrative remedies if they allege a 
"taking" under the Idaho Constitution. 
From your earlier draft which we reviewed, you have proposed adding language to 
the effect that the citation on lines 34-35 to the constitutional defInition of a public use, 
i.e., "necessary to complete the development of the material resources of the state" would 
be broadened by the inclusion of language "or other public uses." This language 
alleviates our minor concern that your original language may actually limit the ability to 
proceed with an inverse condemnation action given an Idaho Supreme Court case which 
held that the constitutional provision is not a limitation on determining what constitutes a 
public use. With the inclusion of this language, we feel that your proposed legislation 
adequately conveys your intent. 
I hope this letter is of assistance to you. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to contact me. 
TFG\yj 
RESPONDENT' S BRIEF 
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Very truly yours, 
7J-1~-
THOMAS F. GRATTON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Intergovernmental & Fiscal Law Division 
Page C-13 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND TAXATION COMMITTEE 
VISITOH MiD 'l'ESTIMON'l SIGN-U P SlIEET Date ~ . .. J - 1('" 
Name Representing Legislation wish to t estify Handouts Oppose/ 
Address/cIty / zip interested in Yes/No available support 
Roh?x-;' D. ~ I, . 
S~(. D(J'-O 1&F .. 901\e(?;(/ rJO 
i-Je ~?>701 ' iA+n 
Da.li> :Cob" T;t;, Co 1!!1. Ud ; 5.$/52 ~ t1. $-Cf 
-~(L (:C .\-z)~ v /VlA,· , -VrH 
-1-€c9.. S p\l ~e)~\j' - ' 01M"", 'h \{ J><, ~V)\ J Vvl ,-I i1 7(;< 
~~ ;::.~~ jfov;1 o;; h75t;-2-~ ~""~.-c:..-
GILA) /Ii~ r/~, C{s e.. H /r; (~Ie IS S~;f ,> fp)vStJ 'C:. 
-!iu/lJ/~ 
I • . 
t~'~&b&' . 1r8 7{l Yes ~fJfhj .. ~})G 
4~,£d:- 111 € /A ituC4.. /-//1 oDe; /\/J ..w//J 
~'\r ~A\Z[)GR- I' I ( Y -e-~ (( 
Bya~ ~.Jrvp;>J(1!.. lilt Ci-U.u[ fA... iJ8<661 l'iv ~~vb -
p ' .?'f "i W ' 'tt Y " )" 'iiMtiWtfiC' · fZ ~· b - • ' ttC"" wY 2Z%"Q"W1!&P&Nft't1scw " ~'tZX1 '7@1 v 
U ' 7 " 
DATE--=3_---'-I_-_~'__~ __ 
ROLI, CALL VOTE 
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AYE NAY AlE AYE NAY AlE 
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WHEELER 1 WHEELER 
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MOVED ____________________ __ 
SECONDED __________________ _ 
- ----_._ .. ---_ .. _. .--------------- - _. __ ..... .... _ ..- .. 
BILL 
AMENDED ~.HJBSTITIJTE MQTIQN 










MOVED ____________________ __ 
SECONDED __________________ _ 
ADDENDUMD: 
MCCALL ZONING ORDINANCE § 3.10.12 (MAR. 16, 2006) 
Sterling Codifiers, Inc. Page I of2 
3.10.12: AMENDMENTS TO FINAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN: 
(A) Subsequent Amendments: 
1. Any subsequent amendment to the final development plan changing location, siting, 
and height of buildings and structures may be authorized by the commission, without 
additional public hearings, if required by engineering or other circumstances not 
foreseen at the time the final plan was approved. 
2. In no case shall the commission authorize changes which may cause any of the 
following: 
(a) A change in the use or character of the development, including ownership. 
(b) An increase in overall coverage of structures or significant changes in types of 
structures. 
(c) An increase of the intensity of use or types of usage. 
(d) An increase in the problems of traffic circulation and public utilities. 
(e) A reduction of off street parking and loading space. 
(f) A reduction in required pavement widths. 
(8) Change Requiring Public Hearing: All other changes in use, rearrangement of lots, 
blocks and building tracts, or in the provision of common open spaces and changes in 
addition to those listed above which constitute substantial alteration of the original plan 
shall require a public hearing before the commission and approval by the council. 
(C) Expiration: 
1" On the anniversary year after general development plan and program approval, until 
the project is complete, the applicants or applicants' successors, shall file a progress 
report. If substantial construction or development has not taken place within four (4) 
years from the date of approval of the general development plan and program, the 
commission shall review the PUD program at a public hearing to determine whether or 
not its continuation, in whole or in part, is in the public interest, and, if found not to be, 
shall recommend to the council that the PUD approval be revoked. 
2. After action by the commission, the council shall consider the matter and by resolution 
accept or reject it or return it to the commission for further action. Notice and hearing 
shall be provided according to the same procedures as are then applicable to a new 
application, with the present owner of the property being sent notice by certified mail, 
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and a title company title search for the name and address of the current owner{s). 
(Ord. 821, 2-23-2006, eff. 3-16-2006) 
http://www.sterlingcodif1ers.com/codebook/printnow.php 
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